That rate is tied with 1955 and 1956 as the lowest in the FBI’s recorded historical series, which begins in 1900. It is a comparison of homicide rates relative to population, not necessarily a comparison of total killings.

The FBI released the early 2025 figures on May 13, 2026. The estimates show broad declines in reported crime, but they are preliminary and can change before the bureau publishes its final Reported Crimes in the Nation, 2025 report later this year.

Homicide and other offenses declined

Overall violent crime fell an estimated 9.3% from 2024 to 2025, according to the FBI’s early annual release. Rape declined 7.6%, robbery fell 18.5% and aggravated assault decreased 7.2%.

Property crime fell an estimated 12.4%. Motor-vehicle theft dropped almost 23%, according to Associated Press reporting on the FBI figures.

The national numbers provide an early picture of crimes reported to participating law-enforcement agencies after the pandemic-era increase in homicides. They do not mean public-safety risks have disappeared or that every community experienced the same change.

How much data are included

The estimates draw on information from more than 17,000 law-enforcement agencies covering about 96% of the U.S. population. More than 15,000 agencies submitted data through the National Incident-Based Reporting System, or NIBRS, covering nearly 90% of the population.

The FBI’s Crime Data Explorer now publishes monthly data, allowing the bureau to release preliminary trends sooner than in the past. The faster schedule improves timeliness, but it also means the early annual figures should be read as an initial estimate rather than a final accounting.

Why the numbers can change

Participation in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting program is voluntary for agencies outside the federal system, and not every department reports every month. Agencies are responsible for correcting errors in previously submitted data, and those corrections can be incorporated into later releases.

The FBI says its preliminary trend displays use a three-month delay to give reported data time to stabilize. The 2025 estimates are also subject to revision before the final annual report.

These figures describe crimes known to participating law-enforcement agencies, not every crime that occurred. Crimes that victims do not report to police are not captured in law-enforcement statistics.

Independent data point in the same direction

Independent analysis supports the broad direction of the FBI’s findings. The Council on Criminal Justice’s mid-year 2026 report examined monthly crime data from 36 large U.S. cities. For the 30 cities providing homicide data, reported homicides were 18% lower in the first half of 2026 than in the first half of 2025, a difference of 215 killings.

The council also reported declines in most of the 13 offense categories it studied, including robbery and motor-vehicle theft. But it cautioned that its city sample is not necessarily representative of the nation and that local figures can later be revised.

The cause remains unsettled

The FBI’s figures establish a sharp decline in reported crime; they do not establish why it happened. FBI Director Kash Patel credited changes at the bureau and the Trump administration in the agency’s release, but that is an official claim, not a finding demonstrated by the crime estimates.

Researchers have pointed to multiple possible contributors, including changes in policing and criminal-justice operations, technology, demographics, behavior and local policy. Rates have fallen across jurisdictions with different political leadership and public-safety strategies, making it difficult to assign the national trend to one president, policy or program.

For readers, the immediate takeaway is that reported crime moved sharply lower in 2025, especially homicide and robbery. The next important checkpoints are the FBI’s final annual report and later monthly revisions, which should provide a more settled picture and additional geographic detail.

Sources

• FBI: Historic Early Look at Annual Crime Data
• Associated Press: U.S. homicide rate hits 75-year low
• Council on Criminal Justice: Mid-Year 2026 Crime Trends

The public status records do not give specific resolution dates or provide detailed FBI training, policy or audit materials showing exactly how the safeguards operate. “Resolved” also is not the same designation as “closed” in the inspector general’s tracking system.

What the January review found

The DOJ Office of the Inspector General issued its management advisory memorandum on January 14, 2026. It examined FBI Security Division investigations involving employees with security clearances who were subjects of alleged security concerns. The underlying investigations reviewed by the FBI Inspection Division took place from January 1, 2021, through July 9, 2024.

The review followed a complaint about interview questions in a case involving an FBI employee who had entered a restricted area near the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. The memorandum cited questions about whether the employee had expressed support for President Trump, objected to COVID-19 vaccination, intended to attend January 6 events or attended a Second Amendment rally.

The OIG also cited questions involving religious discussions, church involvement, reading material and attendance at other rallies or demonstrations. It said some questions were vague or overly broad and were not sufficiently tailored to legitimate security concerns, creating a risk of unnecessary intrusion into potentially constitutionally protected activity.

At the same time, the OIG said it found no evidence that such questions were routinely prepared or asked. The FBI Inspection Division reviewed 1,216 Security Division investigations and concluded that questions appearing not to pertain to the national-security guidelines may have been asked in 22 cases.

What the three recommendations required

The first recommendation called for specialized training for Security Division supervisors and investigators. The training is intended to help personnel recognize potentially constitutionally protected activity and conduct interviews without unnecessary intrusion.

The second called for clear protocols requiring heightened approval when opening certain investigations of employees with security clearances, along with notification within Security Division leadership when those investigations are opened.

The third called for heightened supervision in cases likely to involve potentially protected activity. It also said consultation with the FBI Office of General Counsel about the propriety of interview questions should be part of that supervisory process.

The OIG’s current records list each recommendation as resolved. That status confirms the watchdog’s current tracking designation, but the public pages do not spell out the implementation steps the FBI supplied or establish that every future interview will follow the recommended safeguards.

Why the distinction matters

Security-clearance investigations can affect federal employees’ jobs and access to classified information. The OIG recognized that questions touching on beliefs, associations or political activity can sometimes be relevant under national-security adjudication guidelines, including when investigators are examining alleged criminal conduct, violence or associations with people involved in criminal activity.

The concern was narrower: questions that, as worded, could seek information about protected expression, religion or association without a clear connection to the security issue under review. The memorandum did not conclude that the cited questions proved unlawful discrimination or constitutional violations.

The OIG described the issue as limited rather than widespread or routine. It nevertheless said the questions created significant enterprise and public-confidence risks for the FBI and the Justice Department because they could affect how employees, witnesses and the public perceive the fairness and objectivity of security-clearance and investigative work.

What to watch next

The next meaningful evidence would be more specific than a status label. Readers, federal employees and lawmakers could look for FBI implementation guidance, training materials, revised procedures, audit results or additional OIG follow-up explaining how the safeguards operate in practice.

For now, the verified development is that all three recommendations from the January 14, 2026, memorandum are marked resolved. The public record confirms the oversight status, but provides limited detail about the changes behind it.

Sources

• DOJ OIG report page for Memorandum 26-009

Federal authorities said the sites were used to solicit sensitive U.S. information from people who held or previously held security clearances. The alleged approach presented the contacts as consulting or employment opportunities, according to the Justice Department.

The FBI replaced all 13 seized domains with takeover warning pages. Those pages served as the immediate public response to the websites and alerted visitors that the federal government had intervened.

What authorities allege

The Justice Department said the websites offered fake consulting opportunities designed to induce people to disclose classified or otherwise sensitive information. The alleged targets included both current clearance holders and people who no longer held clearances.

Federal authorities described the domains as backed by suspected Chinese agents. That wording identifies the alleged connection described by the department, but it does not establish that Chinese government officials directly operated the websites.

The department also linked the activity to money laundering. The public announcement did not identify individual defendants in connection with the domains, and the seizure was announced as a government action against the websites rather than as a reported conviction or final court finding.

The alleged targeting extended to U.S. persons nationwide. The action therefore involved a national audience even though the investigation specifically included the FBI field offices in Washington and Norfolk.

Federal response

The investigation involved the Justice Department’s National Security Division, the FBI Washington Field Office and the FBI Norfolk Field Office. Together, the agencies took control of the 13 internet domains and placed warning pages on them.

The seizure interrupted the websites’ public operation and made the alleged recruiting approach visible to people who might otherwise have encountered the consulting offers. The FBI’s warning pages also distinguished the federal action from a routine website closure: visitors were shown that the domains had been taken over by authorities.

The Justice Department said the sites sought information from people with current or past access to classified or sensitive U.S. government information. That focus is central to the national-security concern described by the department: foreign intelligence services may seek to recruit people who possess specialized knowledge or access through apparently legitimate professional opportunities.

The operation illustrates a counterintelligence effort aimed at preventing the recruitment of people connected to classified or sensitive government work. It also shows how federal authorities can respond publicly to suspected online solicitation by disabling the domains and using the seized websites to warn potential visitors.

The action does not, by itself, establish that a particular person disclosed classified information through the sites. The Justice Department announcement did not report arrests or criminal charges, and it did not say whether anyone provided classified or sensitive information in response to the alleged offers.

For current and former security-clearance holders, the federal action identifies deceptive consulting opportunities as the alleged vehicle used by the 13 domains. The warning pages remain the concrete public measure described in the announcement, while the investigation continues through the Justice Department’s National Security Division and the FBI offices in Washington and Norfolk.

DOJ said the defendants included 90 doctors and other licensed medical professionals. The department described the action as its 2026 National Health Care Fraud Takedown, involving federal prosecutors, law-enforcement agencies and international partners.

The cases involve allegations, not established findings of guilt. Each defendant is entitled to the presumption of innocence unless the allegations are proven in court.

What the operation covered

The Justice Department said the alleged conduct included schemes to submit false claims for health-care services and opioid-related conduct. It also said the activity caused significant patient harm in some cases, including deaths.

The department did not describe all 455 defendants as participants in one coordinated scheme. Instead, the national takedown brought together multiple investigations and prosecutions involving health-care providers, medical professionals and alleged conduct affecting health-care billing and opioid use.

International cooperation was part of the effort. DOJ said arrests or returns connected to the cases involved Kyrenia, Estonia and the Philippines. The announcement characterized the action as a national U.S. enforcement effort supported by international partners, rather than as a single local prosecution.

The FBI participated in the broader federal fraud and public-health investigations described by the Justice Department. The operation therefore combined cases involving alleged financial misconduct with cases that the department linked to risks to patients and opioid abuse.

Alleged amounts varied by case

The more than $6.5 billion figure is the department’s total allegation for the operation. DOJ also highlighted individual cases with substantially different alleged amounts.

One defendant was linked to a scheme involving more than $3.7 billion, according to the department. DOJ separately identified a previously charged scheme involving $10.6 billion and two defendants.

The department also referred to a previously charged telemedicine-fraud scheme involving $1.2 billion. That reference shows that the national action included both newly announced charges and cases that had already been charged.

These figures describe alleged claims or scheme amounts. They are not findings that the full amounts were fraudulently obtained or losses established after trial. The Justice Department did not announce a single recovery total for the operation or a final disposition for every defendant.

Why the charges matter

The announcement reaches across several parts of the health-care system. Providers and licensed professionals face criminal allegations; insurers and public programs may be connected to the claims at issue; and patients may be affected when alleged conduct involves treatment, prescribing or other medical services.

The department’s description of patient harm, including deaths, adds a public-health dimension to the financial allegations. The cases are not limited to questions about whether a claim was properly billed. Some of the conduct was also described as involving opioid abuse and serious consequences for patients.

At the same time, the charges do not establish that every defendant committed the same acts or that every alleged claim caused a loss. The cases must be evaluated on their individual allegations and evidence. The July 16 announcement identified the defendants, alleged amounts and investigative scope, but did not resolve the outcome of the cases.

In an updated alert dated July 20, 2026, the FBI said the scheme can deceive and revictimize people who have filed complaints with IC3. The warning applies nationwide and highlights a second fraud risk for people who may already have lost money or reported an online crime.

How the impersonation scheme works

The scammers pose as FBI personnel or IC3 representatives while pretending to assist with complaints. That approach can make a fraudulent contact appear connected to an earlier report, potentially giving the impersonator access to people who are already worried about a cybercrime incident.

The FBI’s warning identifies people involved in IC3 complaints as targets. The bureau describes the activity as an effort to deceive and revictimize prior victims, rather than as a legitimate follow-up by federal investigators.

For people who have already reported online crime, the warning is significant because a prior complaint may become the basis for another attempted fraud. A person who believes an official is helping with an investigation or a loss may be more likely to trust a message or call that appears to come from the FBI or IC3.

The FBI’s payment warning

The FBI said it will not ask private citizens to move money by wire transfer, cryptocurrency or gift cards. A request for any of those payment methods from someone claiming to represent the bureau or IC3 is therefore inconsistent with the FBI’s stated policy.

The warning covers three commonly used payment channels: wire transfers, cryptocurrency and gift cards. The FBI’s statement gives people a direct test for identifying a purported contact that is asking for money in connection with an online-crime complaint.

The bureau directs victims of online crime to report through IC3. IC3 is the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center, and the July 20 alert specifically concerns scammers using the center’s identity while contacting people connected to complaints.

Part of a broader 2026 alert series

The IC3 impersonation notice appears in the FBI’s 2026 cyber-alert series. The bureau’s 2026 archive lists 152 items, including warnings involving U.S. organizations and critical infrastructure.

The archive places the July 20 notice among the FBI’s current public cyber alerts. Its inclusion in that series underscores that the warning is a current federal cybersecurity notice, while the specific alert focuses on impersonation of the FBI and IC3.

The FBI has not disclosed a nationwide victim count or total dollar loss for this impersonation scheme. The public warning also does not identify a single confirmed criminal group behind the activity.

What people should do

People who are victims of online crime should use IC3 to report it, according to the FBI. Anyone contacted by a purported FBI or IC3 representative should be especially cautious if the contact includes a request to move money by wire transfer, cryptocurrency or gift card.

The July 20 alert is an ongoing warning rather than an announcement of a completed enforcement action. The FBI’s public direction is to use IC3 for online-crime reports and to recognize that requests for those payment methods do not come from the bureau.

Martino, 41, of Land O’Lakes, Florida, was sentenced on July 9, 2026. The case provides a completed federal enforcement outcome in a ransomware investigation involving a person who had worked in the cybersecurity and incident-response field.

What prosecutors said happened

Court documents said Martino began conspiring with BlackCat/ALPHV operators in April 2023. The conspiracy involved efforts to extort five ransomware victims in the United States.

The Justice Department also said Martino conspired with former cybersecurity professionals to attack additional victims. The department’s announcement did not identify all five victims.

BlackCat, also known as ALPHV, has been associated with ransomware attacks in which victims’ data or computer systems are taken hostage and money is demanded for restoration or to prevent disclosure. In this case, Martino’s prior experience in cyber incident response placed him in a position connected to the response side of such attacks, according to the department’s account.

The sentence does not mean Martino personally carried out every attack described in the case. The federal case centered on conspiracy to extort victims and on helping attack additional victims.

Part of Operation Riptide

The Justice Department said the prosecution was part of the FBI’s continuing Operation Riptide. The operation is one element of federal efforts to identify and disrupt ransomware activity and pursue people involved in attacks against victims.

The department also pointed to earlier FBI disruption efforts. Those efforts produced a decryption tool that reportedly helped victims avoid approximately $99 million in ransom payments.

Decryption tools can allow some victims to restore access to encrypted systems without paying an attacker. The reported savings figure describes ransom payments that the FBI tool helped victims avoid; it is not a measure of all losses caused by ransomware.

The broader cost of cybercrime

The Justice Department said Americans reported more than $20 billion in cybercrime losses during the prior year, a 26% increase from the year before. The figure covers cybercrime broadly, rather than ransomware alone, and reflects reported losses.

That distinction matters because ransomware is only one part of the wider cybercrime landscape. The number nevertheless underscores the scale of the financial harm described by federal authorities as they pursue cases involving ransomware groups, facilitators and people with specialized technical knowledge.

The Martino prosecution also illustrates the security risk created when people with trusted access or incident-response experience assist criminal operators. A person familiar with how organizations respond to a cyberattack may understand the pressure points involved in negotiations, system recovery and decisions about whether to pay.

What happens next

Martino’s 70-month sentence is the completed punishment announced in the case. The Justice Department said the FBI’s Operation Riptide effort is continuing, meaning federal investigators and prosecutors remain focused on ransomware-related activity beyond this individual prosecution.

For businesses and other organizations responding to ransomware, the case is a reminder that an incident can involve more than an outside criminal group. Federal authorities are also examining the role of insiders, former cybersecurity personnel and others who may help attackers identify, pressure or target victims.

The two-count indictment, announced by the Justice Department, alleges conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists and conspiracy to commit murder on federal government territory and to murder a federal official.

The alleged plot was connected to the UFC Freedom 250 event held at the White House on June 14, 2026. Prosecutors allege that the planned violence involved senior government officials and other high-profile people, including the president, the vice president, other federal officials, Israel’s prime minister and Elon Musk.

The indictment also refers to other high-value targets, but the Justice Department’s announcement did not identify every person included in that description.

What prosecutors allege

According to the Justice Department, the alleged conspiracies involved efforts to assemble or use money, firearms, ammunition, body armor, explosives, drones, medical equipment, communications equipment and personnel.

The allegations describe a coordinated threat involving a major public event at the White House as well as plans targeting federal officials. The charges therefore combine a terrorism-related material-support allegation with murder-conspiracy allegations tied to federal property and a federal official.

The potential stakes are severe. Conspiracy to commit murder carries a possible penalty of up to life in prison.

The indictment is a charging document, not a finding that the alleged conduct occurred. The eight defendants are presumed innocent unless and until prosecutors prove the charges in court.

Investigation across multiple states

The indictment was returned in Columbus, Ohio. The investigation involved the U.S. Attorney’s Offices for the Southern District of Ohio, Nebraska, Missouri, California and Washington, along with the FBI and the U.S. Secret Service.

The participation of those offices and federal agencies reflects the geographic scope of the investigation described by the Justice Department. The alleged target event, however, took place at the White House in Washington, D.C.

The Justice Department’s National Security Division lists the case among its national-security prosecutions. The department’s announcement identifies the alleged equipment, targets and participating agencies, but the public information provided here does not establish how far the alleged preparations had progressed or whether prosecutors considered an attack operationally imminent.

What happens next

The case will proceed through the federal criminal process. Prosecutors must prove the charges against each defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, while the defense will have an opportunity to challenge the allegations and the government’s evidence.

The indictment’s filing marks the formal charging stage of the case, not its resolution. The central issues ahead will include the evidence supporting the alleged conspiracies, the defendants’ individual roles and whether prosecutors can establish the elements of each charge in court.

For the public, the case highlights the security risks surrounding large events involving national leaders and the breadth of federal investigations when alleged threats cross state lines. It also underscores the distinction between a government allegation and a proven criminal act: the charges describe an alleged plan, while the court process will determine what, if anything, the defendants did and whether they are legally responsible.

David Murray, 43, of Philadelphia, was arrested July 16 and charged with robbery and firearms offenses, according to the township’s release. District Justice Scott Palladino arraigned Murray and set bail at $250,000 cash.

The charges are allegations. The police announcement does not establish a conviction, and it does not say whether Murray entered a plea or whether he remains in custody beyond the arraignment.

What police said happened

The robbery was reported at approximately 7:26 a.m. June 13 at the CVS in the Glenside section of Abington Township. Police said a masked male displayed a handgun, forced an employee into the store’s office area and removed currency from a safe.

The precise location identified by police is the CVS Pharmacy at 2622 Jenkintown Road. The business is used by Glenside residents and workers, making the arrest a significant development for people connected to the local store and the surrounding area. The release, however, does not say that the pharmacy is closed, that customers face an ongoing threat or that the robbery reflects a broader increase in crime.

Investigation and arrest

Investigators from the three agencies worked together to identify Murray, police said. The arrest came July 16, more than a month after the June 13 robbery. The release names Murray as the suspect identified through that investigation but does not provide additional information about how authorities identified him.

It also does not confirm whether property or the handgun was recovered, whether anyone was injured or whether Murray remains at the Montgomery County Correctional Facility. Those details are not established by the approved release.

Police seek information

Authorities are asking anyone with information about the robbery or the investigation to contact Detective Alison Gontowski at 267-536-1113 or agontowski@abingtonpa.gov.

That request is the next publicly identified step in the case. The township announcement does not provide a further court date or another deadline. Additional court or custody information would require confirmation from an appropriate official record.

The New Jersey Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Cell, or NJCCIC, responded to the incidents and is working with the affected utilities, the FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. The names of the two systems have not been publicly identified, and officials have not disclosed whether the incidents affected operations.

The developments place New Jersey water infrastructure inside a wider investigation involving attacks or attempted intrusions reported in at least 12 states. The incidents involve operational technology, the computer systems and industrial controls used to monitor or manage water infrastructure.

What is known about the New Jersey incidents

The available information does not establish that New Jersey drinking water was contaminated or unsafe. It also does not establish that water service was interrupted anywhere in the state. An impacted water system does not necessarily mean that customers lost service or that the quality of water changed.

Officials have not disclosed the extent of any effect on the two systems’ operational technology, system integrity or sensitive infrastructure. They have also not identified the attackers. Investigators reportedly suspect that Iranian-affiliated hackers may be involved in the broader activity, but that remains an investigative suspicion rather than a final attribution.

That distinction matters because a cyber incident can involve an attempted intrusion, unauthorized access or manipulation of a control system without producing a confirmed outage or contamination event. The public record available for the New Jersey incidents does not specify which of those conditions occurred.

Federal warnings and state requirements

On April 7, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, FBI, CISA and National Security Agency issued a joint cybersecurity advisory about Iranian-affiliated cyberattacks against water systems. The advisory provided steps utilities could use to identify exploited vulnerabilities and strengthen their cyber resilience.

The federal warning focused on operational technology and internet-exposed industrial controls, which can create a pathway into systems used to monitor or control infrastructure. Water utilities depend on those systems for parts of their daily operations, making cybersecurity a direct public-service concern even when no customer-facing disruption has been confirmed.

New Jersey’s existing Water Quality Accountability Act requirements also establish a reporting process for qualifying cybersecurity incidents. A water purveyor whose industrial-control system experiences a covered incident must report it to NJCCIC within 30 days.

The requirements cover incidents involving adverse effects, disabling or manipulation of infrastructure, loss of service, contamination or infrastructure damage. Applicable purveyors must also maintain cybersecurity programs and reporting processes.

Investigation continues

The broader activity was reported after multiple states disclosed attacks or attempted intrusions against water systems. The FBI, CISA and other agencies are investigating the incidents, according to reporting by the Associated Press.

For New Jersey residents, the immediate confirmed development is the state’s response to two affected municipal systems, not a statewide compromise. There is no information in the approved reporting showing that all New Jersey water systems were targeted or that the incidents caused a general interruption of water service.

NJCCIC and its federal partners are expected to continue incident response and investigation. That work may determine how the systems were accessed, whether operational technology was affected and whether additional protective measures are needed. Until officials release more information, the names of the utilities, the scope of any system impact and the identity of the attackers remain unresolved.

The arrests occurred in Ohio, Missouri, Nebraska and California, making the case a multi-state federal public-safety investigation involving a major sporting event and protection of government officials. The alleged target was the UFC event in Washington, D.C.

The Justice Department later announced that a Chicago man had been arrested in connection with the alleged planning. That June 26 update said seven other individuals had also been charged, bringing the number of people described in the later DOJ update as charged in connection with the alleged planning to eight.

What authorities allege

According to the Justice Department’s June 16 announcement, authorities allege that the defendants planned an attack targeting government officials and others attending the Ultimate Fighting Championship event. The release described the alleged conduct as an effort to attack and kill people at the White House event.

The FBI said it became aware of a potential threat on June 10, six days before the first group of charges was announced. The subsequent arrests in four states reflect the geographic scope described in the public DOJ materials, but the releases do not establish that an operational attack was imminent.

The later announcement involving the Chicago defendant referred to an indictment that described planning discussions in Signal messaging groups. The public materials identify those online communications as part of the alleged planning described by prosecutors. They do not, however, establish the defendants’ guilt or independently show that the alleged plan had reached a particular operational stage.

Why the case matters

The investigation combines alleged domestic-terrorism planning, weapons acquisition, online threats, protection of government officials and security concerns surrounding a major nationally televised sporting event. It also illustrates the prevention challenge posed by activity that investigators say crossed state lines and involved online communications.

For the public, the immediate significance is that federal authorities said they identified a potential threat and made arrests before announcing the initial charges. The case also places a nationally prominent sports event at the center of a federal investigation involving the Justice Department, the FBI and other law-enforcement partners.

The available announcements do not provide a verified account of whether weapons were obtained, how close the alleged plan was to execution, or what security measures were used at the event. Those details should not be inferred from the arrests or charges.

What happens next

The investigation continued after the June 16 announcement, with the later arrest and additional charges disclosed on June 26. The public DOJ releases supplied with this report do not establish the current case status, the defendants’ plea positions or trial dates.

Indictments and criminal complaints contain allegations, the Justice Department said, and all defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty in court. The federal docket would be needed to establish later procedural developments, including any pleas, hearings or trial schedules.

The filings, including one from the FBI Agents Association, were submitted during the week ending August 4, 2026, in Garman v. Patel, a proposed class action pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

The case remains unresolved. No court has ruled that the terminations violated the Constitution, and the proposed class has not been certified.

What changed this week

The Associated Press reported that five outside groups filed briefs supporting the former employees. The groups include the FBI Agents Association, former Justice Department and FBI officials, First Amendment scholars, Lawyers for the Rule of Law and Justice Connection, a network of department alumni.

The briefs present a broader institutional concern: Career employees may be less willing to accept politically sensitive assignments if they believe their work could later be judged through a partisan lens.

The FBI Agents Association, which AP reported represents nearly 12,000 members, argued that agents must be able to accept lawful assignments without fearing later political punishment. Its brief said agents are routinely assigned and reassigned according to bureau needs, creating a difficult choice if accepting an assignment can later become grounds for dismissal.

What the lawsuit says

Jamie Garman, Blaire Toleman and Michelle Ball filed the lawsuit on March 31, 2026. The defendants are FBI Director Kash Patel, Attorney General Pam Bondi, the FBI and the Justice Department.

According to the complaint, the three former FBI employees worked on investigations involving Trump, including the Arctic Frost investigation. They allege they were summarily fired because of that work and because the administration perceived them as politically opposed to Trump.

The complaint also alleges that the employees were accused of “weaponizing” the FBI despite not receiving findings of misconduct. Those claims are allegations, not established facts, and the defendants have not been found liable in this case.

The lawsuit seeks to represent other former FBI employees who were allegedly terminated because of perceived political affiliation and without adequate procedural protections. The proposed class includes more people than the three named plaintiffs, but the court has not granted class certification.

The constitutional questions

The complaint raises First Amendment retaliation and political-association theories. The plaintiffs argue that the government may not fire public employees because of actual or perceived political affiliation when political loyalty is not a legitimate job requirement.

They also raise Fifth Amendment procedural due-process claims. In practical terms, they say they should have received notice of the allegations against them and a meaningful opportunity to respond before losing their jobs and facing damage to their professional reputations.

The complaint points to FBI policies and employment rules that, according to the plaintiffs, created an expectation that non-probationary employees would be removed for job-related reasons such as documented performance problems or misconduct. Whether those policies created a constitutionally protected employment interest is one issue the court may have to consider.

Why executive authority matters

The administration’s side of the dispute is expected to center on executive control over federal law enforcement and personnel. The case therefore raises a tension between presidential authority to direct executive agencies and the legal protections that may apply to career employees.

The lawsuit does not claim that FBI employees can never be reassigned, disciplined or dismissed. Instead, it challenges the alleged reasons and process used in these particular terminations. The court will have to determine whether the plaintiffs have stated viable constitutional claims and whether those claims can proceed against the named defendants.

What happens next

A June 3 docket order set the schedule for the expected motion to dismiss. The defendants’ motion was due June 28, 2026; the plaintiffs’ response was due July 28; and the defendants’ reply is due August 18. The court also continued the deadline for a class-certification motion until after it rules on the motion to dismiss.

That makes the next significant step the court’s consideration of whether the case can proceed. If some or all claims survive, the judge could later address whether the lawsuit should cover a broader group of former FBI employees.

For the FBI, the practical question is larger than the employment status of three former employees: Can career employees work on politically sensitive investigations without risking punishment based on the subject of the investigation or perceived political views? The answer will depend on rulings that have not yet been made.

Sources

• Associated Press: FBI agents fired over Trump investigation get broad backing
• Class Action Complaint in Garman v. Patel
• Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse case record

The memo described the matter as a “priority investigation” and said each employee was expected to check an estimated 708 records by July 17, 2026. The staffing action shows the scale of the federal effort. It does not establish that investigators found election fraud, that charges are imminent or that the FBI has reached a final conclusion.

What the FBI is reviewing

The investigation centers on Fulton County, Georgia’s most populous county, which includes most of Atlanta. FBI agents seized hundreds of boxes containing ballots and other election records from the county’s election hub in January 2026.

The records review concerns an election whose results were examined repeatedly. Georgia’s 2020 presidential vote was counted three times, including a hand count, and each count confirmed Joe Biden’s victory.

The Justice Department has described the federal inquiry as involving alleged “irregularities” connected to the 2020 presidential election in Fulton County. It is separate from the state prosecution previously brought by Fulton County District Attorney Fani Willis.

What the staffing surge means

A request for hundreds of personnel from FBI field offices nationwide represents a substantial allocation of federal investigative resources. The memo indicates that the bureau has prioritized a large records operation and set a defined workload and deadline.

But a records review is an investigative step, not a finding of criminal conduct. The sources reviewed for this article did not identify a federal charging announcement, a final FBI conclusion or evidence establishing that widespread fraud changed Georgia’s 2020 result.

The FBI and Justice Department investigate possible violations of federal law. States administer elections and count and certify the results. An active federal investigation does not itself reopen a certified election or invalidate the counts that confirmed Biden’s win.

District judge quashes request for election-worker information

The investigation also faces a legal limit. On July 7, U.S. District Judge William Ray quashed a Justice Department grand jury subpoena seeking the names and personal contact information of county employees and volunteer poll workers involved in the 2020 election.

Ray described the subpoena’s scope as “staggering” and ruled that the request was unreasonable because the investigative need was low compared with the burden of disclosing the information. He also wrote that the information could not support viable charges based on the conduct at issue because the statute of limitations had passed.

The Justice Department argued that the subpoena was part of the normal investigative process and sought records identifying people with relevant knowledge. The district-court ruling addresses that subpoena; it does not resolve every possible investigative step or appeal.

What to watch next

The clearest indicators of where the case is headed will be a specific charging document, a new court order, an appeal, an official FBI or Justice Department statement, or a disclosed evidentiary finding tied to a federal statute.

Until then, readers should distinguish the documented staffing surge and January records seizure from conclusions that have not been publicly established. The FBI’s 260-person deployment shows that the Fulton County investigation is receiving substantial federal attention. It does not, by itself, prove that fraud occurred or that anyone will be charged.

Sources

• Associated Press: FBI directs hundreds of analysts to its probe of Georgia’s 2020 election
• FBI and DOJ election-security fact sheet

An updated public service announcement dated July 20, 2026, says the ongoing scheme uses fake FBI identities, spoofed websites, social-media accounts and AI-generated videos to promise recovery of money victims already lost. The reported goal is to obtain another payment or collect more personal and financial information.

How the recovery scam works

The warning updates an April 18, 2025, alert. Complainants have reported being contacted by phone, email, social media, messaging apps or online forums. The person reaching out may claim to be an FBI agent, an IC3 employee or another authority figure who has recovered the victim’s funds or can help retrieve them.

In one reported version, a scammer posing as an FBI agent contacted a prior victim through Facebook Messenger and Telegram, then sent a link presented as a way to update an IC3 report. The FBI says such links may collect additional financial information or contain malicious code.

In another reported version, criminals used AI-generated videos depicting senior FBI personnel and directed viewers to a fake IC3 website. The imitation site used a similar structure and content to the official site, asked for a name, phone number, email address, scam type and estimated loss, then supplied a reference number and promised follow-up contact.

The FBI also says scammers may use caller-ID spoofing, synthetic voices and real-time or private video chats to make a fraudulent contact appear genuine. AI-generated content can be difficult to identify reliably, so visual or audio details should not be the only basis for deciding whether a message is authentic.

What IC3 will and will not do

IC3 does not maintain a social-media presence and will not investigate complaints or recover funds through Facebook, Telegram or similar platforms. It also says it will not directly contact individuals through phone calls, email, social media, apps, online chats or public forums.

If additional information is needed, contact may instead come from FBI employees at local field offices or other law-enforcement officers. The FBI says IC3 never charges a fee to recover lost money and will not refer victims to a company that requests payment for recovery.

The FBI’s Cyber Alerts page continues to list the July 20 warning as an alert about an ongoing fraud scheme targeting people who have already reported cybercrime. The IC3 homepage likewise warns that the center will never directly contact people for information or money. IC3 says complaints are used for investigative and intelligence purposes, but it cannot guarantee a response to every filer.

Steps to take if you are contacted

• Stop communicating with anyone claiming to recover your money through IC3, and do not send money or sensitive information.
• Type Ic3 directly into your browser’s address bar. Check that the address is correctly spelled and ends in “.gov.”
• Avoid sponsored search results and links supplied in emails, messages or social-media posts.
• Treat requests for recovery fees, cryptocurrency, gift cards, wire transfers or prepaid cards as fraudulent.
• Save phone numbers, email addresses, usernames, website addresses, messages, screenshots and payment records.
• Report the incident through the legitimate IC3 website. Include the contact information, websites, social-media profiles, payment details and other evidence you saved.

Filing a complaint does not guarantee a response or recovery of funds, but IC3 says reports help law enforcement understand broader threats and may support investigative action.

If someone is in immediate danger, call 911 or local police. For online crime, use the official IC3 reporting system and do not rely on a link or contact supplied by the person who approached you.

Sources

• FBI/IC3 warning on impersonation scams
• FBI Cyber Alerts listing

In a January 14, 2026 management advisory memorandum, the DOJ Office of the Inspector General said FBI Security Division investigators sometimes prepared or asked vague, overly broad questions about political activity, religious expression and other conduct that could be constitutionally protected.

The FBI concurred with three recommendations. But the OIG’s tracking rules make clear that a recommendation marked “resolved” means the department has agreed to implement it or proposed actions that address it. It does not mean the OIG has confirmed full implementation.

What prompted the review

The review followed a June 2024 complaint involving an FBI employee who entered a restricted area near the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, and later had a security clearance revoked. The memorandum did not assess whether that revocation or any other personnel action was justified.

Instead, the OIG examined how the FBI’s Security Division investigates employees who hold security clearances when alleged security concerns may overlap with speech, beliefs or associations.

The questions at issue

Among the interview questions reviewed by the watchdog were whether an employee had voiced support for President Trump, objected to COVID-19 vaccination, expressed an intent to attend January 6, or attended the Richmond Lobby Day event, a Second Amendment demonstration. Other examples concerned religion, church involvement, books and attendance at rallies or demonstrations.

Those examples came from interview outlines or interview reports reviewed by the OIG. They do not establish that the employees engaged in wrongdoing or that the FBI treated political or religious activity alone as disqualifying.

The OIG said some questions were too broad to be clearly tied to a legitimate security concern. That creates a risk that investigators solicit information about protected expression or association that is not relevant to clearance adjudication.

The watchdog did not find evidence that such questions were routinely prepared or asked. It described the problem as limited in frequency but significant as an enterprise risk because it could affect employees’ and witnesses’ understanding of how clearances are evaluated and public perceptions of FBI objectivity.

Why narrow questions matter

Security-clearance decisions can consider information relevant to allegiance, judgment, reliability, candor and the protection of classified information. The OIG specifically discussed Guideline A, concerning allegiance to the United States, and Guideline E, concerning personal conduct.

That does not mean political or religious activity is automatically outside the scope of a security investigation. The OIG recognized that beliefs, associations or conduct may sometimes be relevant when they are connected to matters such as violence, criminal conduct, efforts to obstruct federal duties or other concerns identified in the adjudicative guidelines.

The issue is whether an interview question is narrowly connected to that security concern. For example, the OIG said questions about attendance at rallies could be relevant when an investigation concerns alleged criminal conduct at a rally, while a general question about attending rallies where no criminal conduct occurred may unnecessarily intrude into protected activity.

The three safeguards the FBI accepted

The OIG recommended specialized training for Security Division supervisors and investigators on recognizing potentially protected activity and conducting interviews without unnecessary intrusion.

It also called for clear protocols requiring heightened approval and leadership notification when an investigation is likely to concern potentially protected activity. The third recommendation requires heightened supervision, including consultation with the FBI Office of General Counsel about the propriety of interview questions.

The FBI concurred with all three recommendations and was asked to report actions taken or intended within 90 days of the January 14 memorandum.

Why “resolved” does not mean fully implemented

The OIG’s recommendations page says “resolved” means DOJ has agreed to implement a recommendation or proposed actions that would address it. The OIG may close a recommendation only after determining that sufficient action has been taken to fully implement it.

The OIG’s report page currently lists all three recommendations as resolved. The individual tracker page for Recommendation 1 also lists it as resolved. Those entries show agreement or proposed corrective action, not independent confirmation that training, approval controls, supervision and legal review are operating effectively in every relevant investigation.

The OIG says its recommendation information is updated monthly and that statuses can change as DOJ takes steps and the OIG independently reviews those efforts. The most meaningful evidence of implementation would include completed training materials or records, written approval requirements, documented supervisory reviews and a later OIG determination that the recommendations are closed.

Broader accountability context

The memorandum comes amid a separate national dispute over due process and alleged political retaliation involving FBI personnel. The Associated Press has reported on lawsuits by three former FBI agents seeking to regain their jobs after being fired following work connected to investigations involving Donald Trump. That litigation is broader context about federal personnel accountability; it does not establish whether the safeguards in this OIG memorandum have been implemented.

What to watch next

Future OIG tracker updates, follow-up reviews and congressional oversight could clarify whether the FBI’s corrective measures are functioning in practice. Court filings involving federal employee due-process or retaliation claims may add context, but they would not by themselves answer the specific implementation question.

The central accountability issue is narrower than whether the FBI may ever ask about political or religious activity. It is whether investigators can connect those questions to a legitimate security concern, use appropriate supervision and obtain legal guidance before protected activity is unnecessarily drawn into a clearance investigation.

Sources

• DOJ OIG Management Advisory Memorandum 26-009
• Associated Press report on FBI personnel lawsuits

Existing Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court certifications and related directives can remain operative under their stated terms. Rep. Warren Davidson, R-Ohio, said in a June 12 statement that the certifications then in place would continue through March 2027. That date should not be read as a universal expiration date for every Section 702-related authorization.

The distinction matters because Congress is now debating what comes next: whether to reauthorize the authority, whether to require a warrant before the FBI searches Section 702 information using an American’s identifier, and how to strengthen reporting and compliance rules.

What changed on June 12

Section 702 permits the government to collect foreign-intelligence information by targeting certain people outside the United States. Congress must periodically authorize the program, and the House did not pass a short-term extension before the June 12 deadline.

The result was a lapse in the statute’s current congressional authorization. It was not, however, an immediate termination of all collection, storage or related activity conducted under certifications and directives approved before the lapse. The precise legal and operational effects of the lapse remain part of the congressional and legal debate.

That leaves lawmakers facing a renewal decision rather than a simple restart. Congress could enact a long-term reauthorization, attach new privacy and oversight conditions, or allow existing certifications to run toward their stated expiration while negotiations continue.

How Section 702 affects Americans

Section 702 is designed to target non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States for foreign-intelligence purposes. Americans are not supposed to be the targets of that collection.

Americans’ communications can nevertheless be collected incidentally when they communicate with a foreign target or appear in information connected to a foreign target. A later search of stored Section 702 information is called a query. The FBI says a query does not create new collection; it searches information the government already acquired.

Under existing procedures, the FBI may use U.S.-person query terms such as a name, email address or telephone number. The FBI says such a query must have an authorized purpose, be reasonably designed for that purpose and have a specific factual basis indicating that it is reasonably likely to retrieve foreign-intelligence information or, in limited circumstances, evidence of a crime.

What the 2025 numbers show

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence estimated that 349,823 non-U.S. persons were targeted under Section 702 in calendar year 2025, up from 291,824 in 2024.

The ODNI report also counted 7,413 FBI U.S.-person query terms in 2025, compared with 5,518 in 2024. A query term is an identifier used to search the data. The figure does not necessarily represent 7,413 unique Americans, investigations or successful accesses to communications.

ODNI separately reported 1,081 FBI U.S.-person evidence-of-a-crime-only queries conducted for discovery purposes. FBI users accessed results in 245 of those queries. Those figures do not mean that 1,081 Americans were surveilled, charged or prosecuted. They describe searches of Section 702-acquired information under the reporting categories used by the government.

ODNI said the evidence-of-a-crime-only category is limited under the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, which largely restricted that type of FBI query while retaining exceptions. The report also cautioned that year-to-year figures can change with litigation, criminal matters, operational priorities and other factors.

What safeguards exist

The FBI says its safeguards include case-specific justifications for U.S.-person queries, mandatory training, audits and recurring reviews by the Justice Department and ODNI. It also requires enhanced review for certain sensitive queries involving categories such as elected officials, members of the media, academics and religious figures.

The FBI has acknowledged serious past compliance problems, including improper queries involving Americans who took part in peaceful protests. The agency says reforms adopted beginning in 2021 added opt-in controls for unminimized information, attorney approval for large batch queries and stronger documentation requirements.

Those safeguards are the government’s account of its current compliance framework. Privacy advocates and lawmakers seeking additional restrictions argue that internal rules and executive-branch oversight do not provide enough protection, particularly when Americans’ information is searched without a traditional warrant.

What Congress is arguing over

The most prominent dispute is whether reauthorization should require a warrant before the government searches Section 702 information using an American’s identifier. That is a proposed reform, not current law.

Supporters of the program say U.S.-person queries can help identify Americans who are victims of foreign hacking, espionage, terrorism, kidnapping or other threats. The FBI has argued that a broad warrant requirement could delay the use of information already lawfully collected.

Critics say searching Americans’ communications without a warrant creates a serious Fourth Amendment concern, even when the original target was overseas. Other potential reforms include putting FBI compliance policies into statute, expanding reporting to Congress, tightening provider obligations and increasing penalties for violations.

No replacement framework was established by the June lapse itself.

What to watch next

The next important markers are any bill to reauthorize Section 702, congressional oversight hearings, new court filings and additional transparency reports. Davidson identified March 2027 as the point through which the existing certifications and directives would continue, but the timing and scope of any future certifications could depend on further legal and congressional action.

For the public, the immediate question is not whether every surveillance activity stopped on June 12. It is what Congress will authorize next and whether lawmakers require a warrant, stronger reporting or other controls before restoring the statute.

Sources

• ODNI Annual Statistical Transparency Report for Calendar Year 2025
• Rep. Warren Davidson statement on the lapse of FISA Section 702
• Associated Press: Congress fails to extend FISA spy tool as deadline closes in
• FBI: Oversight of Section 702 and Related Surveillance Authorities

The Internet Crime Complaint Center issued the warning on May 27, 2026. It does not describe a confirmed breach of FIFA’s systems. Instead, it concerns spoofed websites designed to look like official FIFA pages and trick visitors into sharing information or sending money.

How the fake websites work

According to the FBI, criminals create look-alike domains by making minor changes to legitimate web addresses. The sites may use misspellings, unusual top-level domains or names that imitate FIFA subdomains.

The FBI gave examples including altered spellings, domains ending in something other than .com and addresses that place words such as “tickets,” “jobs” or “careers” next to the FIFA name. The bureau said it had identified dozens of suspicious domains and expected additional fake sites to appear before and throughout the tournament.

The listed domains should not be assumed to remain active. The alert also does not establish a final number of victims or total financial losses.

Visitors to a spoofed site may be asked for names, home addresses, phone numbers, email addresses or banking information. A site may also request payment for tickets or hospitality products that are never delivered or are not valid for entry.

Why search results and social media can be risky

A scam can begin with a search, a sponsored advertisement or an unsolicited social-media message. Fans looking for last-minute seats, resale tickets or hospitality packages may be redirected to a copycat site where urgency and limited availability are used to pressure a quick payment.

Associated Press reporting published June 17, 2026, described fake ticket sites, social-media offers and fraudulent streaming pages as ongoing risks during the tournament period. AP also reported that many previously identified sites had stopped working or had been flagged as malware, but the FBI warned that new look-alike domains could continue to appear.

How to check an offer

The FBI recommends typing Fifa directly into the browser instead of relying on a search result or advertisement. Fans should inspect the complete domain carefully and avoid pages with misspellings, unusual endings or questionable subdomains.

For ticket information, start with FIFA’s official ticketing page and follow links from the official FIFA website. The Federal Trade Commission has separately advised World Cup consumers to use official FIFA channels and to be wary of copycat websites and social-media promotions. General third-party resale offers should be evaluated separately from official FIFA sales, and buyers should understand the seller’s delivery, replacement-ticket and refund policies before paying.

Paper tickets, screenshots and unusually cheap offers deserve extra caution. FIFA has warned that buying outside official channels can carry risks including fake or invalid tickets and inflated prices. HTTPS, FIFA branding or a professional-looking design alone does not prove that a site is legitimate.

What to do if you entered information

Do not send additional money or provide more passwords, identity details, banking information or cryptocurrency to an unfamiliar seller. Contact your bank or card issuer promptly if you paid or shared financial information, and ask what steps may be available to stop or reverse the transaction.

Save the fake site’s domain, messages, receipts, payment details and screenshots of the interaction. Report suspected cyber fraud or data theft to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center and report consumer scams to the FTC. Continue monitoring bank, card and other accounts for unauthorized activity, and change any reused password.

Fans should continue to expect impersonation attempts tied to high-demand matches, resale tickets, hospitality packages and tournament streaming. Starting with FIFA’s official website and checking every web address before entering information can reduce the chance of paying a scammer or handing over data that may be used for later fraud.

Sources

• Internet Crime Complaint Center: FIFA website spoofing alert
• Federal Trade Commission: World Cup scam guidance
• Associated Press: World Cup ticket scam explainer
• FIFA: Official 2026 World Cup ticket information

Operation Safe Summer involved the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office, the Birmingham Police Department and the FBI. The agencies reported the results as part of an effort focused on reducing crime and improving business safety across the Birmingham area.

Arrests, warrants and traffic enforcement

Authorities said the operation produced 76 arrests. The available report does not identify the alleged offenses involved, provide a municipality-by-municipality breakdown of the arrests, or say how many occurred within Birmingham city limits.

An arrest is not a conviction. The report also does not provide case outcomes, charges, court dates or the identities of people arrested.

Authorities said they cleared 193 outstanding warrants during the operation. The report did not specify the nature of those warrants or whether the warrant clearances were connected to the 76 arrests.

Officers also made 150 traffic stops, resulting in 193 citations and 103 warnings, according to the agencies’ reported totals. The available report does not break down the citations or warnings by violation, agency or location.

Firearms and business checks

The agencies reported seizing 13 illegal firearms. No additional details about the firearms, the circumstances of the seizures, associated allegations or jurisdictions were provided in the available report.

Teams also completed 26 business safety checks. The report does not name the businesses checked or describe the findings of those visits.

The figures provide a snapshot of the enforcement activity reported by the participating agencies. They do not, on their own, establish whether crime fell across Birmingham or Jefferson County, and no follow-up crime data was included in the available report.

What is known next

The results announcement did not state when Operation Safe Summer began or ended. It also did not announce a further enforcement date, a future reporting deadline or additional operational details.

Residents and businesses in the Birmingham area are among those covered by the reported focus on crime reduction and business safety. The published results identify the scale of activity reported by the participating agencies, while leaving key details about individual cases, locations and longer-term outcomes unspecified.

The filing moves the pretrial dispute beyond the meaning of the post and toward how investigators gathered, presented and disclosed evidence. The claims are allegations by Comey’s lawyers, not a court finding that the FBI or Justice Department acted unlawfully. The case remains pending, and no dismissal has been granted.

What the defense is challenging

In a memorandum supporting a request for a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, Comey’s lawyers argue that affidavits used to obtain Apple and Google records contained intentional or reckless misstatements and material omissions. They say investigators presented a misleading account of the evidence supporting the theory that Comey understood “86” as a violent organized-crime term.

The defense says investigators’ searches of FBI records, organized-crime files and trial transcripts did not establish that Comey had learned that meaning during his earlier prosecution work. The motion also says investigators omitted information about a person identified in the filings as “Person-1,” including that the person initially understood “86” as restaurant terminology and later formed a different interpretation.

Comey’s lawyers further dispute descriptions of actions by his attorney and wife that appeared in the warrant materials. They argue that those descriptions created inaccurate impressions about whether either person had tried to hide evidence or misled investigators. Those assertions remain contested and have not been resolved by the court.

What the motion says about Salvatore Gravano

The defense motion also refers to a May 2026 interview with Salvatore Gravano, a former Gambino crime-family member and government cooperator who was connected to a case Comey prosecuted earlier in his career. According to the motion, Gravano said he did not recall discussing the term “86” with Comey or hearing it used during the trial.

The defense argues that this information, along with other unsuccessful efforts to connect Comey to a violent meaning of “86,” should have been disclosed or reflected in the warrant applications. The motion’s description is the defense’s account of the interview and its legal significance; the judge has not ruled that investigators were required to reach the conclusion Comey’s lawyers seek.

What the indictment alleges

The Justice Department announced the indictment on April 28, 2026, after a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of North Carolina returned two counts. One charges Comey under 18 U.S.C. § 871 with threatening the president. The other charges him under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) with transmitting a threat in interstate commerce.

The indictment alleges that Comey knowingly and willfully posted an image on Instagram on May 15, 2025, depicting “86 47,” and that a reasonable person familiar with the circumstances would view it as a serious expression of an intent to harm the president. The second count alleges that he consciously disregarded a substantial risk that the communication would be viewed as a threat of violence.

Those are allegations in an indictment, not adjudicated facts. The Justice Department has stated that Comey is presumed innocent unless proven guilty.

Why the filing matters

If the court grants a Franks hearing, it could examine whether the warrant affidavits contained false statements or material omissions and whether those problems affected probable cause. If the defense ultimately proves the required legal elements, the court could suppress evidence obtained through the warrants. That could affect the government’s ability to use evidence gathered from the digital accounts.

The defense is also seeking dismissal on broader grounds, including arguments that the prosecution is vindictive or selective. A dismissal would end the current indictment unless prosecutors successfully appealed or obtained another lawful path forward. At present, however, the motions have only put those questions before the court.

Earlier judicial criticism involved a different case

A separate Associated Press report described a magistrate judge’s criticism of Justice Department conduct in another Comey prosecution in Virginia. That case accused Comey of lying to Congress, and the judge’s concerns involved grand-jury materials, alleged misstatements of law and procedural irregularities in that proceeding.

That criticism provides broader procedural context but is not a ruling on the warrant allegations in the North Carolina threat case. The two prosecutions should not be treated as one proceeding, and the earlier ruling does not establish that the current warrant applications were unlawful.

What happens next

The government is expected to respond to the new motions. The judge could decide the requests on the written filings or schedule an evidentiary hearing concerning the warrant applications, investigative records and disclosure issues. The court also must address the separate dismissal arguments before the case can move toward trial.

The central question is now twofold: what Comey intended by the Instagram post and whether the government’s investigative and warrant practices complied with constitutional and procedural requirements. The next significant developments will be the Justice Department’s response, any hearing orders and the judge’s rulings on suppression or dismissal.

Sources

• U.S. v. Comey defense motion
• Associated Press report on the new motions
• U.S. Department of Justice indictment announcement

DOJ describes a multi-state investigation that is being handled through separate federal-district proceedings for different defendants. All suspects are presumed innocent unless and until convicted in court.

What DOJ says the alleged plot targeted, and when

DOJ says the FBI and law-enforcement partners learned on June 10 about a potential threat tied to the UFC event in Washington, D.C., involving individuals outside the National Capital Region.

According to DOJ, investigators allege conspirators planned to use explosive-laden drones to force an evacuation during the event, and then deploy snipers to fire on “high value targets” within the fleeing crowd.

June 16: DOJ charges five men across multiple federal districts

On June 16, DOJ announced charges against five men and described a coordinated plan to carry out an attack to kill government officials and others attending UFC Freedom 250 on the White House grounds. DOJ listed the defendants as Tycen C. Proper, Bryan Omar Roa, Michael Alan Thomas, Daniel K. Eskridge, and Abraham Hermosillo Alvarez.

DOJ also said the complaints and supporting materials were filed in multiple districts, including the Southern District of Ohio, the Western District of Missouri, the District of Nebraska, and the Central District of California.

June 22: FBI arrests two more suspects tied to drone allegations

On June 22, DOJ said the FBI arrested two additional men: William Lee Spartacus Falkner and Jordan W. Rincker, bringing the total number of people known to be facing federal charges to seven, according to reporting by The Associated Press.

DOJ described allegations that Falkner discussed drone-related plans and explosive loading, and that Rincker was tied to weapons and allegedly providing drone-related assistance.

June 26: obstruction-of-justice case adds a “Signal uninstall” allegation

On June 26, DOJ announced an obstruction-of-justice charge involving Alexander Iniguez Mercado, 20, of Chicago. DOJ said Mercado was allegedly an administrator and member of Signal messaging groups that included people discussing planning a violent attack targeting the UFC event at the White House on June 14.

DOJ says that the day before the event, an FBI special agent spoke to Mercado by telephone about online threats and whether he planned to travel to Washington, D.C. DOJ alleges Mercado then uninstalled the Signal application, making related message data unavailable. DOJ said Mercado’s maximum penalty, if convicted, is 20 years in prison.

DOJ also said Mercado was scheduled for an initial appearance in federal court in Chicago at 3:00 p.m. on June 26 before U.S. Magistrate Judge Gabriel A. Fuentes for the Northern District of Illinois.

What to watch next

This case is still moving—DOJ says the investigation remains ongoing—so court filings and docket activity matter. For public accountability, readers should watch each district’s docket for:

• Initial appearances and any detention/bail hearings
• Arraignments, plea activity, and scheduling changes
• New filings that clarify how prosecutors link alleged drone planning and alleged obstruction conduct
• Whether additional suspects are named as DOJ continues through the separate proceedings

Sources

• DOJ Office of Public Affairs (Press Release): FBI arrests two more men in the White House UFC plot (June 22, 2026)
• Associated Press: Report on two additional arrests in the planned White House UFC attack plot

The DOJ said the sites were set up to lure current and former security-clearance holders, along with other people who had access to classified or sensitive government information, by advertising consulting or analyst roles through fake companies.

According to the affidavit cited by the department, the operation used aliases, stolen identities, AI-generated photos, encrypted apps and job platforms such as social media and freelance sites to make the pitches look legitimate. Officials said applicants were then pressed for non-public or insider information.

Why it matters

The practical warning is aimed at anyone in a clearance-heavy job: unusual consulting offers, vague job pitches and pressure for confidential material are red flags. Federal officials said people should treat easy-money recruiting pitches with caution and report suspicious activity to the FBI.

What to watch next

The next developments are whether prosecutors or investigators release more records about who operated the sites and whether additional charges follow. For now, the confirmed action is the June 10 seizure of the 13 domains and the FBI takeover pages that replaced them.

Sources

• U.S. Department of Justice press release on the 13 website seizures
• Associated Press report on the FBI and China espionage case
• Reuters report republished by Investing.com on the domain seizures

The federal notice adds another layer to a case that local reporting says San Bernardino County deputies are treating as a possible kidnapping. The FBI has now posted a wanted/missing-person notice asking for help from anyone who may have information about Hou’s disappearance.

That makes this more than a routine missing-person update. For Rancho Cucamonga residents, it is an active public-safety investigation with local and federal agencies both asking for tips.

What the official notice says

The FBI’s notice identifies Hou as a Rancho Cucamonga resident and says he was last seen on March 16. The notice is the clearest official confirmation that the case is still open and that investigators want the public’s help.

ABC7 Los Angeles reported that San Bernardino County deputies are investigating the disappearance as a possible kidnapping. CBS Los Angeles also reported on the FBI’s public search effort, underscoring that the case has drawn wider attention beyond the neighborhood where Hou lived.

The Los Angeles Times likewise reported on the FBI’s involvement in the disappearance investigation. Together, the reports and the federal notice show that investigators are still trying to piece together what happened after Hou was last seen.

What residents should do

If you have credible information about Hou’s whereabouts or about events connected to his disappearance, investigators want tips. The safest path is to use the official channels listed by the FBI notice or contact local law enforcement directly.

Do not assume someone else has already reported what you know. Even a small detail about a vehicle, a timeline, a location, or a possible witness can matter in a missing-person case, especially when investigators are treating it as a possible kidnapping.

For Rancho Cucamonga residents, the most useful step is to read the federal notice carefully and share any relevant information promptly rather than posting rumors or speculation online.

Why this matters locally

Cases like this are unsettling because they are immediate and local. Hou is not just a name in a regional crime report; he is described by the FBI as a Rancho Cucamonga resident, and the public request for help is coming while the investigation remains active.

Until officials say otherwise, the case should be treated as ongoing. The main public takeaway is simple: if you know something, tell investigators.

Sources

• FBI wanted/missing-person notice for Nai Ping Hou
• ABC7 Los Angeles report on FBI joining the search