Senators approved S. 3897, the Officer John Barnes and Chief Michael Ansbro Public Safety Officers’ Benefit Program Expansion Act of 2026, by unanimous consent on August 7, 2026, after agreeing to Amendment No. 6764, an amendment in the nature of a substitute. The House received the Senate message on August 10 and held the measure at the desk.

As of August 29, 2026, S. 3897 is not law. Current claims continue under existing rules, and the bill’s proposed deadlines and interim payments are not available unless Congress approves the measure and it is enacted.

What the bill would change

S. 3897 would require the Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Bureau to notify a claimant or the relevant agency within 90 calendar days after receiving a claim if information needed to process it is missing. It also would require the Bureau to provide a final, appealable eligibility determination within 270 calendar days after receiving all information required to process the claim.

The 270-day clock would not begin simply because an application was submitted. It would begin after the Bureau received the information required to process the claim, which could matter to families and injured officers whose applications require additional records or documentation.

If the Bureau missed the 270-day deadline, the bill would require a single interim benefit payment in certain delayed cases. The payment could go to a claimant whose status as an eligible beneficiary is undisputed or, when beneficiary status remains unresolved, to an escrow or fiduciary account pending a final determination.

The proposed interim payment would be credited against any final benefit determination. The Bureau generally could not recoup or require repayment of the money, except in cases involving fraud or material misrepresentation. The payment also would not create an entitlement if the claimant or decedent were ultimately found ineligible, and it would not override rules governing mutually exclusive beneficiaries.

The proposal would require ongoing outreach to public-safety officers and underserved public agencies, including disabled officers. The outreach would include regular communications with national public-safety organizations, agencies and organizations supporting disabled officers and families of fallen officers.

The bill also would require the Bureau to send Congress a summary of specified backlog information within 30 days after publishing its required report. In addition, the Comptroller General would conduct annual audits of claims that had been pending for more than one year when each audit began. The audits would examine the claim’s location in the process, reasons for delay, outreach, claims assistance and other program-management issues.

If enacted, the bill would direct the attorney general to ensure that the Bureau of Justice Assistance implements recommendations from a 2024 Government Accountability Office report within 180 days after enactment.

Who could be affected

The PSOB program operates nationwide. It provides death benefits to eligible survivors of law-enforcement officers, firefighters and other public-safety officers who die in the line of duty. It also provides disability benefits for officers who suffer qualifying catastrophic injuries and education benefits for eligible survivors and families.

For applicants, the practical effect of the proposal would be greater visibility into what information remains outstanding and when a final decision is due. The interim-payment provision could provide limited financial support in some prolonged cases, but it would not guarantee approval or replace the final eligibility decision.

Why lawmakers are considering changes

A 2024 GAO review found that PSOB had not fully reported the number of claims pending for more than one year, even though that information was required. GAO also identified broader weaknesses involving transparency, claims assistance and program management. Those findings concern the operation and reporting of the program, not allegations of individual misconduct.

The Justice Department reported on July 15, 2026, that the program had finalized more than three times as many death-claim determinations during the prior four weeks as in the previous nine-month period, providing more than $96 million in benefits to eligible surviving families. That is the department’s account of a recent processing surge; it does not by itself show that the reporting and management concerns identified by GAO have been resolved.

Independent Associated Press reporting has also described the program’s growth, delays and the complexity of death and disability claims.

What happens next

The House is the next legislative checkpoint. It could pass the Senate measure, amend it or take no action. The House companion, H.R. 7718, is a separate bill that GovInfo lists as introduced on February 25, 2026, and referred to the House Judiciary Committee; it is not the same as House passage of S. 3897.

If both chambers approve identical text, the bill would still require presidential action before becoming law. Any implementation timeline would begin only after enactment and the required agency actions.

For now, families of fallen officers and catastrophically injured public-safety officers should continue using the existing PSOB application and claims-assistance channels. The proposed 90-day notice, 270-day determination deadline and interim payment are not current benefits.

Sources

• Congressional Record, August 7, 2026 — Senate passage of S. 3897
• GAO — PSOB transparency and claims-assistance review
• Justice Department — PSOB claims-processing update

The case, docketed as No. 26-1169, remains pending. The newest developments are an appellees’ brief filed August 19 and three amicus briefs filed August 26—not a final ruling on the law.

What changed in the appeal

American Oversight, the American Historical Association, the Freedom of the Press Foundation and Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington urged the appeals court on August 19 to affirm U.S. District Judge John Bates’s preliminary injunction.

The groups argue that the administration’s facial challenge is too broad. Their position is that the Presidential Records Act has legitimate applications and that any disputed provisions could be addressed through narrower remedies rather than invalidating the law in its entirety.

The administration’s position is laid out in an April 1 Office of Legal Counsel opinion. The opinion says the 1978 law exceeds Congress’s enumerated and implied powers and improperly intrudes on presidential independence. It advised that the president need not comply with the statute.

That is the administration’s legal position, not a final judicial determination. The D.C. Circuit has not ruled on whether the Presidential Records Act is constitutional.

What the district court ordered

In a May 20 opinion, Bates concluded at the preliminary-injunction stage that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed in showing that the law is constitutional. He also found a substantial risk that records could be lost, deleted or otherwise not preserved, causing harm that could not later be repaired.

The injunction, which took effect May 26, requires covered Executive Office of the President personnel and offices to preserve presidential and vice-presidential records under the statute. The order does not direct President Donald Trump or Vice President JD Vance personally; the court explained that the relief applies to covered officials and offices identified in the order.

The court focused in part on electronic communications, including messages created or sent through nonofficial accounts and records involving the president or vice president. The dispute includes text messages, personal devices and encrypted messaging applications used for official business.

The Presidential Records Act generally covers documentary materials created or received in carrying out official constitutional, statutory or other duties. It does not automatically cover every communication connected to the White House: materials of a purely private or nonpublic character, such as personal journals or campaign information, are excluded.

Why the new amicus briefs matter

On August 26, a bipartisan group of 25 former national-security officials filed an amicus brief urging the D.C. Circuit to uphold the order. The former officials served in Republican and Democratic administrations and included people who worked in the White House, National Security Council, CIA, intelligence community and other agencies.

They argue that records created by Executive Office of the President personnel in the course of government work are government records rather than the president’s personal property. They also warn that future presidents may need predecessor records to understand prior foreign-policy and national-security decisions.

The former officials’ filing is an argument by outside participants in the case, not an official government finding. Its concern is that if records were treated as a departing president’s personal property, a successor could lack important information about prior communications, decisions and foreign relations.

The American Oversight case docket also identifies August 26 amicus filings by former National Archives officials and members of Congress. Together, the filings broaden the dispute beyond historians’ access to records. They raise questions about government continuity, congressional oversight, litigation, accountability investigations and future public access.

What happens next

Oral argument before the D.C. Circuit is scheduled for October 16, 2026. Until a higher court changes the order, the May 20 preliminary injunction remains the operative preservation requirement for covered Executive Office of the President personnel.

The appeals court could affirm the injunction, reverse it or send parts of the dispute back for further proceedings. The case’s ultimate effect on records access, enforcement and archival practice could also depend on later Supreme Court review.

For White House staff, the immediate issue is practical: official business conducted by email, text, personal devices or encrypted applications may need to be preserved under the existing order. For the public, the broader separation-of-powers question is whether presidential recordkeeping remains a statutory duty or becomes more dependent on presidential discretion.

Sources

• U.S. District Court preliminary-injunction opinion
• DOJ Office of Legal Counsel opinion
• American Oversight litigation docket
• Washington Litigation Group national-security amicus filing announcement

The DHS Office of Inspector General released its report in August 2026, nearly two years after Hurricane Milton struck Florida. The findings document misconduct involving one crew while leaving a broader accountability question unresolved because key FEMA records were unavailable.

What happened during the Milton response

According to the investigation, a FEMA crew supervisor directed workers to avoid homes with Trump campaign signs because of safety concerns. Notes reviewed by the inspector general showed that the crew bypassed 11 homes in Florida for political reasons.

The watchdog said using political signage as a basis for avoiding the homes violated the Hatch Act and FEMA policy. The U.S. Office of Special Counsel separately determined that the supervisor violated the Hatch Act by engaging in political activity while on duty and using official authority to influence an election.

The incident occurred as FEMA teams responded to Hurricanes Helene and Milton in the weeks before the 2024 presidential election. FEMA Disaster Survivor Assistance crews canvassed 744,288 homes and other sites during the relevant responses, according to the watchdog’s report.

The report said 555,374 locations were not contacted for reasons that included private-property signs and safety concerns. That figure does not mean those locations were skipped for political reasons. The watchdog identified the 11 Florida homes as the locations documented as bypassed for political reasons.

Why the records gap matters

The larger accountability issue is whether auditors can determine if the Florida incident was isolated. The inspector general said survivor-interaction records became unavailable after a contractor-supported system shut down in September 2025 following the lapse of its contract.

Without those records, investigators could not fully examine whether similar conduct occurred during other disaster responses. The missing data does not establish that aid was denied or withheld elsewhere. It limited the government’s ability to audit how FEMA workers interacted with survivors and why some locations were not contacted.

Government Executive reported that FEMA officials told the watchdog the agency would need to procure a new contract with the vendor to restore the data. The report also identified weaknesses in FEMA’s documentation and supervisory review practices, including inconsistent ethics and Hatch Act training for personnel who could be deployed to disasters.

Independent Hatch Act record

The Office of Special Counsel separately filed a Hatch Act complaint in February 2025 against Marn’i Washington, a former FEMA employee. OSC said Washington instructed subordinates in October 2024 to avoid homes with Trump campaign signs while leading a Florida disaster-relief crew.

That personnel record independently supports the finding about the supervisor’s instruction. It is separate from the DHS inspector general’s review of the 11 homes and its findings about FEMA’s recordkeeping, training and oversight.

FEMA’s response

FEMA concurred with the inspector general’s recommendations. The agency said it increased mission-readiness training, strengthened oversight and took personnel actions against those responsible for the incident. Public accounts describe different actions involving different employees; the available findings do not establish that every worker involved was terminated.

FEMA also said it no longer conducts FEMA-led door-to-door outreach. The agency said staff now provide survivor assistance from fixed locations selected with state and local officials through a data-informed approach.

What to watch next

The next accountability questions are whether FEMA restores or replaces the survivor-interaction records system, implements regular ethics and Hatch Act training, and requires supervisors to review field documentation. Those steps will determine whether future disaster outreach can be independently audited.

For disaster survivors, the practical rule is straightforward: political signs cannot lawfully determine whether federal workers seek to provide information or assistance. The documented misconduct involved 11 Florida homes, but the records gap is why the watchdog could not determine with confidence whether similar conduct occurred elsewhere.

Sources

• DHS Office of Inspector General report
• U.S. Office of Special Counsel Hatch Act record
• Government Executive reporting
• The Washington Post reporting

The review was issued August 26, 2026, after multiple congressional requests received in early 2025. It examined the operational effects of selected CFPB workforce and contract actions, including employee-related actions, stop-work orders and contract changes.

What the review found

According to the inspector general, stop-work orders temporarily left CFPB personnel unable to perform work involving enforcement, supervision and other agency functions.

Contract actions also caused temporary service disruptions affecting the CFPB’s consumer complaint database and other operational processes. The review did not say that complaints were permanently lost or that the agency permanently stopped enforcing federal consumer-finance laws.

Workforce-reduction actions had limited operational impact during the period examined because court orders halted their implementation. The inspector general therefore did not treat those reductions as fully carried out.

The findings describe interruptions in agency operations, but they do not establish how many consumers were affected or whether any disruption caused financial harm.

Why the complaint database matters

The CFPB complaint database allows consumers, researchers and the public to review trends, read complaint narratives and download data about financial products and services. The agency says the database generally updates daily and is intended to show how companies respond to complaints.

There is a built-in delay. Complaints sent to companies for response become eligible for publication after the company responds, confirms a commercial relationship or after 15 days, whichever comes first. Recent trends therefore may not include every complaint that has already been submitted.

The CFPB also warns that the database is not a statistical sample of all consumer experiences. A low complaint count does not necessarily mean consumers suffered little or no harm, and complaint narratives reflect consumers’ accounts rather than findings independently verified by the agency.

What the report did not decide

The inspector general said its review focused on high-level operational effects, not whether the CFPB’s actions complied with laws or regulations. Those legal questions remain connected to ongoing litigation.

The agency-wide review listed zero recommendations, zero questioned costs and zero funds identified for better use. It was not a finding of waste, fraud or financial loss, and it did not quantify the broader effect of the operational disruptions on consumers or financial markets.

How this fits with GAO oversight

A separate Government Accountability Office report, published in January 2026 and publicly released in February, described CFPB reorganization actions that included stop-work orders, closed supervisory examinations and terminations involving employees, contracts and enforcement cases. GAO said some actions were subject to litigation and had not been finalized at the time of its review. The agency said it would examine the effects of those actions in future work.

The two reports answer different questions. The inspector general review provides an operational account of selected workforce and contract actions. GAO’s report addresses the status of the broader reorganization and identifies additional oversight work that may clarify its effect on the bureau’s statutory duties.

What to watch next

Court proceedings and future oversight work may clarify whether the temporary interruptions described in the review led to longer-lasting changes in enforcement, supervision, complaint processing or other CFPB services.

For consumers, the complaint database remains a public resource for examining complaints and company responses. Readers reviewing recent data should account for publication delays and should not interpret a temporary gap or lower recent volume as proof that complaints were not submitted or that consumer problems ended.

Sources

• Federal Reserve Board and CFPB Inspector General review
• CFPB Consumer Complaint Database
• GAO report on CFPB reorganization efforts

DOGE reported $110.3 billion in savings as of July 7, 2026, across contracts, grants and leases. The total covered 13,440 contract entries representing 13,476 contracts, 15,887 grants and 264 leases. GAO said the figure should be read as a DOGE-reported estimate, not an independently verified reduction in federal spending.

The review matters because federal agencies obligated about $2.04 trillion for contracts, grants and leases in fiscal year 2025. Those arrangements support vendors, nonprofit organizations, schools, state and local governments, health programs and federal facilities across the country.

What GAO examined

GAO reviewed Wall of Receipts savings data from January 20, 2025, through July 7, 2026. Auditors compared the reported information with public federal databases, including USAspending.gov and the Federal Procurement Data System, and interviewed officials from selected agencies.

GAO conducted a detailed review of nongeneralizable samples covering 31 contracts and 12 grants, and reviewed all 264 leases listed on the Wall of Receipts. It did not conduct a complete audit of every contract or grant entry.

The Wall of Receipts was last updated on January 1, 2026, although the page remained live as of July 7. GAO said the last reported month of termination was October 2025. U.S. DOGE Service officials did not respond to the auditors’ requests for information or interviews.

Leases already being phased out

One attribution issue involved federal leases. Of the 264 leases listed for termination, GAO found that 108 were already in the process of being terminated by the General Services Administration when DOGE was established on January 20, 2025.

Those leases represented about $15.3 million of the $53.5 million obtained by adding the savings listed for the leases. The finding does not mean every lease estimate was invalid, but it raises a question about whether DOGE could claim savings for actions already underway before the initiative began.

GAO also found a separate accounting problem in the lease total. DOGE’s website reported $113 million in savings for the 264 leases, while the individual entries summed to $53.5 million. After comparing the entries with GSA data and considering other issues, GAO said the Wall of Receipts overstated lease savings by $81.1 million and that the savings supported by the records totaled $31.8 million.

The reported lease savings also did not account for possible costs such as moving expenses, furniture removal or early-termination fees.

A $1.7 billion contract claim

GAO examined a reported $1.7 billion in savings tied to a Department of Defense Defense Health Agency information-technology services contract supporting more than 700 military treatment facilities worldwide.

DOGE initially identified the contract for termination. But GAO found that the contract was not terminated and that its scope, value and funding were not reduced. Based on those facts, auditors concluded that no savings were achieved from that contract.

Methodology and documentation gaps

For contracts, GAO found that DOGE did not use its stated savings methodology for most reported savings. In categories where auditors could assess the calculations, 60.7% of reported contract savings came from situations in which the stated method was not followed. Another 11.8% could not be assessed because contract identifiers were missing.

GAO said DOGE provided too little information to verify the method used for 96% of reported grant savings. The Wall of Receipts also did not explain how savings from terminated leases were calculated.

These distinctions matter because a reported estimate may represent a canceled agreement, an avoided future obligation, work that was already ending or costs that still had to be paid to close out a contract, grant or lease. Those are not interchangeable measures of money returned to the Treasury.

What happens next

GAO made one recommendation: The Executive Office of the President, through the U.S. DOGE Service, should prominently disclose known data-quality problems and limitations on the Wall of Receipts.

The recommendation remains open. The audit does not establish whether the administration has since changed the website or added the disclosures GAO requested.

For taxpayers and Congress, the practical test is documentation. Future scrutiny will likely focus on which agreements were legally canceled, what obligations were actually avoided, what costs were incurred during termination and whether savings were attributed to DOGE or to agency decisions already in progress.

Organizations receiving federal grants or contracts should also be cautious about treating a Wall of Receipts entry as proof that an award has been finally terminated. A public listing may not show the final legal or financial status of an agreement.

Sources

• Government Accountability Office audit
• GAO-26-108615 full report
• Associated Press report

The center’s immediate role is to identify possible fraud that crosses programs or jurisdictions and generate criminal leads for investigators and prosecutors. The launch does not itself change eligibility rules, suspend benefits or reduce payments.

What changed

The National Fraud Detection Center operates within DOJ’s National Fraud Enforcement Division. The department says the center is designed to address fragmented oversight, in which information about the same person, business or organization may be held separately by different agencies or programs.

DOJ says the center will combine analytical and investigative capabilities to support criminal investigations and prosecutions. A lead generated by the center would still require separate investigative work, prosecutorial review and, where appropriate, charges or other legal action.

That distinction matters. The public launch is an organizational action, not an announcement that the center has already uncovered a specific nationwide fraud scheme, secured convictions or recovered money.

Who is involved

DOJ identified the FBI, Homeland Security Investigations, IRS Criminal Investigation, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, the Treasury Department and the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee as participating federal entities.

The department also listed inspectors general for Agriculture, Education, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Labor, Veterans Affairs, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, the Small Business Administration and the Social Security Administration.

DOJ named state partners in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Ohio and South Carolina. The listed partners include secretaries of state, state treasurers and South Carolina’s Department of Social Services.

The Labor Department and Social Security Administration inspectors general separately confirmed on August 25 that they signed the center’s charter and committed analysts and investigators. SSA’s inspector general said the arrangement is intended to combine Social Security-specific intelligence with broader federal investigative data.

How it fits into DOJ’s fraud effort

An April 7, 2026 memorandum created the National Fraud Enforcement Division and directed it to coordinate with federal agencies, inspectors general, law-enforcement partners and a federal fraud task force to establish and support a National Fraud Detection Center. The memorandum described the center’s purpose as identifying fraud across taxpayer-funded programs and generating leads for investigators and prosecutors.

A separate August 13 enforcement-priorities memorandum said the broader Fraud Division expected to reach approximately 500 attorneys and staff by August 24. It identified public financial integrity, health care, taxes, global trade and commerce, and corporate misconduct as priority areas. The listed program areas include student aid, child care, veterans’ benefits, nutrition assistance, disaster relief and small-business programs, as well as procurement and health care.

Why the scale matters

The Government Accountability Office reported that 20 major federally funded, state-administered programs accounted for about $1.1 trillion in federal obligations in fiscal year 2025 and nearly 90% of obligations among programs administered by state and other government entities with obligations above $100 million. The programs include Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program and disaster assistance.

GAO found documented evidence of complete fraud-risk assessment in only five of the 20 programs it reviewed. The other 15 programs did not have that documentation. GAO said the decentralized structure can leave programs vulnerable to schemes involving recipients, subrecipients, contractors and other participants.

GAO has estimated that the federal government loses between $233 billion and $521 billion annually to fraud, based on data from fiscal years 2018 through 2022. That is an estimate of potential fraud losses, not a tally of confirmed cases attributable to the new center.

Separately, GAO reported approximately $186 billion in estimated improper payments across 64 programs in fiscal year 2025. Improper payments are payments that should not have been made or were made in the wrong amount; they are not synonymous with confirmed fraud. GAO said approximately $153 billion, or about 82%, of the estimate involved overpayments.

What readers should watch

For people receiving federal benefits, the launch does not automatically alter program rules or make ordinary recipients targets. Its practical effect will depend on how agencies use the information and what safeguards they apply to prevent mistaken matches or unsupported suspicions.

Businesses, health-care providers, contractors, grant recipients and benefit administrators could face more cross-agency scrutiny if investigators identify patterns that span programs or jurisdictions. Any enforcement action would still require the applicable investigative, administrative or legal process.

The most meaningful tests will be whether the center produces documented referrals, prosecutions and recoveries, and whether agencies can show measurable reductions in fraud without unjustified disruption to legitimate services.

DOJ has not publicly disclosed a dedicated center budget, total NFDC staffing level, detailed data-sharing rules, privacy safeguards, performance benchmarks, public reporting schedule or recoveries and prosecutions attributable specifically to the center.

Sources

• DOJ launch announcement: National Fraud Detection Center
• GAO report on federally funded, state-administered programs

The EPA Office of Inspector General issued the finding on August 25, 2026, in Report No. 26-P-0049. The audit examined whether the agency maintained a complete inventory of systems whose compromise could seriously affect EPA operations, sensitive information or public trust.

The finding concerns EPA’s classification and oversight process. The report does not say that the agency suffered a breach, that any system was hacked or that data was exposed.

Three systems met the criteria

Auditors judgmentally selected six systems from an EPA inventory of 116. They determined that three met the criteria for high-value assets, or HVAs, because of the informational value of the data they contained, but were not classified that way:

• The Superfund Enterprise Management System.
• The Office of Pesticide Programs Local Area Network.
• The Toxic Substances Control Act Confidential Business Information Local Area Network.

The systems contained sensitive records tied to EPA’s core responsibilities. The Superfund system included investigation, cleanup, enforcement, Freedom of Information Act and litigation-support information. The pesticide-program network held pesticide-registration applications, trade secrets and company financial information. The Toxic Substances Control Act network contained confidential business information, scientific data and technical documents about chemical composition.

Under Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-19-03, federal agencies must establish processes to identify and prioritize protection of high-value assets. An HVA is information or an information system so critical that its loss, corruption or inaccessibility could seriously affect an organization’s ability to perform its mission or conduct business. The designation helps guide monitoring, assessment, contingency planning and remediation.

EPA’s HVA inventory fell from 34 systems to three

The inspector general also pointed to a sharp decline in EPA’s identified HVA inventory. The agency listed 34 HVAs in 2017, but three in 2024.

The OIG did not treat its six-system review as a statistically representative audit of all 116 systems. The systems were selected because they contained different types of environmental information associated with EPA strategic-plan goals. Still, the OIG said the sample findings, combined with the decline in the inventory, suggested that EPA may have considerably more HVAs than it had identified.

Auditors attributed the misclassifications to inadequate governance policies and procedures. They also said EPA did not sufficiently consider the informational value of environmental data when deciding which systems warranted HVA status.

EPA completed the audit’s corrective actions

EPA agreed with the OIG’s findings, conclusions and recommendations. According to the audit’s corrective-action record, the agency implemented written procedures by June 30, 2026, including guidance for system owners and recordkeeping requirements for designation decisions.

EPA also reevaluated the three systems identified by the audit by June 17, 2026. The recommendation required the agency to determine whether the systems should be classified as HVAs and document the supporting rationales. The report confirms that the corrective action was completed, but it does not itself state that all three systems were ultimately designated as HVAs.

Those actions address the specific weaknesses identified by the audit, but they do not erase the underlying finding that the systems had previously been misclassified. The next accountability question is whether the revised procedures produce a complete and durable inventory beyond the three systems examined.

What the audit does not establish

The audit examined selected HVA-program controls. It did not test every cybersecurity control or every requirement in OMB Memorandum M-19-03. The OIG also noted that testing only a limited number of controls within EPA’s three existing HVAs could leave other weaknesses unexamined.

For the public, the immediate takeaway is limited but important: the report identifies a weakness in how EPA decides which systems receive heightened cybersecurity attention, not evidence that sensitive environmental, pesticide or chemical records were breached. Follow-up documentation should show the formal status of the three systems, the rationale for those decisions and whether EPA’s overall HVA count changes.

Sources

• EPA Inspector General audit, Report No. 26-P-0049
• Oversight.gov audit record
• GAO, EPA CIO open recommendations

The report does not say that the military lacks access to all commercial data it buys or that every purchase goes unused. Instead, it identifies a coordination and procurement problem: some potential users may not know what data the government has already purchased, how they are allowed to use it or where to raise access concerns.

What Defense is buying

Commercial space companies provide imagery, analytics and other data collected from private satellites and related systems. The Defense Department uses those products alongside government-owned systems for missions that include space-domain awareness and tactical surveillance, reconnaissance and tracking.

Within the Space Force, the Joint Commercial Operations Cell is the main organization that buys commercial space data and related services. GAO said the cell spent $76.8 million through the contractor-operated Global Data Marketplace from January 27, 2023, through September 30, 2025.

GAO also reviewed commercial imagery purchased by the National Reconnaissance Office and commercial analytic products purchased by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency during fiscal years 2021 through 2025.

Why some officials held back

Space Force officials interviewed by GAO cited licensing costs, perceived restrictions on how data could be used and concerns about continued access over the long term. GAO said those challenges contributed to hesitation among potential users to buy and use commercial data.

Those concerns can matter even after a purchase is made. A government entity may hold a license or subscription without every potential operational user knowing that the data exists or understanding the terms governing access and reuse.

A communication gap

GAO found that the Joint Commercial Operations Cell leads an informal, monthly Cross-Government Commercial Data Sharing Working Group. The group is intended to coordinate current and future commercial space-data purchases made by federal organizations and to discuss user needs.

But some Space Force officials who reported barriers to GAO were not participating in the group, and information about it was not widely available. GAO said many of the challenges officials described could have been addressed through discussions at the working group.

The watchdog said better communication could bring more Space Force and other government officials into the discussions, help resolve licensing questions and improve use of data and services already purchased.

What GAO recommended

GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Air Force ensure the Space Force develops ways to inform current and potential users about the working group and about how to access and use commercial data and services that government entities have purchased.

The Defense Department agreed with the recommendation and said it plans to increase awareness of the working group and access guidance. GAO lists the recommendation as open, meaning the watchdog has not yet confirmed that the department completed the requested action.

What to watch next

The next accountability test is whether the Space Force turns that stated plan into documented procedures. Useful signs would include public or internal information that makes the working group easier to find, clearer instructions for accessing existing purchases and evidence that more operational users are using commercial space data.

The immediate issue is not a new authorization or spending program. It is whether the Defense Department can make the commercial capabilities it already buys easier for authorized users to find, understand and apply to national-security missions.

Sources

• GAO report GAO-26-107959
• Breaking Defense: Space Data Network

The U.S. Department of Commerce inspector general’s report, issued Aug. 19, 2026, found that the Ohio Department of Development did not accurately report financial results, ensure affiliate expenses were allowable, effectively monitor six regional subrecipients or verify the program’s reported economic-impact data.

The findings come as the National Institute of Standards and Technology reviews applications for a new Ohio MEP award. NIST suspended renewal of Ohio’s base award on Dec. 5, 2025. The agency expects to announce awards in mid-September, while ODOD faces an Oct. 18 deadline for an action plan addressing the audit’s recommendations.

What the audit found

Report OIG-26-025-A identified four central oversight failures:

• ODOD reported inaccurate financial results to NIST.
• ODOD did not ensure that subrecipient expenses were allowable under federal award rules.
• ODOD did not effectively monitor subrecipients’ compliance, performance or required reporting.
• ODOD did not verify the accuracy of the Ohio MEP Center’s economic-impact data.

The $20,911,830 figure is a questioned-cost amount, not a final repayment order or a finding that the money was stolen. NIST must still determine which costs were allowable and whether any amount must be recovered.

The audit also identified $5 million in funds that could be put to better use. Those funds were associated with Ohio’s suspended award. The report said ODOD underreported $2,756,752 in program income and indicated that further review could identify additional examples, including income connected to personal protective equipment sales by MAGNET during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The audit also cited understated unexpended program income, overstated nonfederal cost share and costs it described as unallowable, unnecessary, unreasonable or unsupported. It raised concerns about subsidies, internships, indirect costs and potential conflicts of interest. Those are audit findings or allegations, not adjudicated wrongdoing.

Why the program matters statewide

Ohio MEP was managed by ODOD and sponsored through the federal NIST program. It provided small and medium-sized manufacturers with training, coaching, automation assistance, engineering, process improvement and other technical services.

Ohio received nearly $52 million in federal MEP funds since Oct. 1, 2016. The statewide network included six regional partners: the Center for Innovative Food Technology in Toledo, MAGNET in Cleveland, Ohio State University South Centers, PolymerOhio in Westerville, TechSolve in Cincinnati and FASTLANE at the University of Dayton Research Institute.

For manufacturers, the immediate concern is access. A reduction in MEP services can mean fewer publicly supported options for workforce training, apprenticeships, technology adoption, operational consulting and assistance bringing products to market.

Funding pause has already reduced services

The pause in federal support has contributed to reduced operations among regional affiliates, according to reporting by The Associated Press and Spectrum News.

MAGNET said its staffing fell from about 75 employees to 39. CIFT, which serves food and other small businesses in northwest Ohio, reported a reduction from about eight full-time employees to three after obtaining temporary grant support.

The Associated Press reported that TechSolve, FASTLANE and CIFT curtailed operations or planned to suspend or end them. That does not mean every affiliate closed or that all manufacturer services ended statewide. MAGNET remains open, though with sharply reduced staffing and services.

State and affiliates dispute parts of the report

ODOD said it cooperated with the audit and would work with NIST to revise financial reports and strengthen oversight. The agency said it has “zero tolerance for fraud, waste and abuse.”

MAGNET CEO Ethan Karp said the organization disputes the audit’s description of its spending. Manufacturing Dive reported that MAGNET disputes 95% of the $4.6 million in questioned costs attributed to it, while acknowledging a small number of administrative errors it plans to correct.

Karp also disputed the treatment of $6.6 million connected to pandemic PPE sales, saying the money was provided to distribute to manufacturers and was not profit. CIFT CEO Rebecca Singer challenged the audit’s calculation of program income and said state audits of CIFT did not identify misuse of MEP funds.

Those responses do not erase the inspector general’s findings. They show that the final financial consequences remain unresolved and that the organizations are reviewing or contesting specific conclusions.

What happens next

The inspector general made six recommendations. They include determining whether additional enforcement action, including possible termination of ODOD’s award renewal, is warranted; deciding which of the $20,911,830 in questioned costs were allowable; recovering any amount determined to be unallowable; requiring corrected federal financial reports for MEP awards dating back to Oct. 1, 2016; removing unreliable economic-impact data; and strengthening monitoring and certification requirements.

NIST is considering those recommendations and is conducting a new competition for Ohio’s MEP center. The agency expects to announce successful awards in mid-September 2026. ODOD’s action plan is due Oct. 18.

For Ohio manufacturers and taxpayers, the key questions are whether ODOD can produce corrected financial records, whether NIST recovers any money and whether Ohio receives a new award under a stronger oversight structure. No permanent termination or final repayment decision has been announced.

Sources

• Commerce Department OIG final audit, OIG-26-025-A
• Associated Press report carried by WTOP
• Spectrum News 1 Ohio affiliate-response report

The watchdog said the Navy has not fully addressed the maintenance, idle-time and shipyard-capacity problems affecting the fleet. GAO also warned that submarines awaiting retirement could create another multibillion-dollar burden if the Navy does not change how it handles decommissioning.

What GAO found

GAO reviewed Navy attack-submarine maintenance data for fiscal years 2016 through 2025, along with Navy documents and interviews with officials. The report said lost operational days included delays in completing depot maintenance and what the agency calls active idle time.

Active idle time occurs when an attack submarine and its crew must remain pier-side because the submarine is no longer certified to conduct normal operations and cannot be inducted into a maintenance period. The submarine and crew continue to require personnel and support while the boat is unavailable for regular operations.

GAO said the public version of the report omits classified or sensitive information, including details about attack-submarine operational availability and the Navy’s approach to force generation.

Decommissioning backlog adds a second risk

GAO separately examined inactive idle time involving submarines designated for decommissioning. Those boats cannot begin the retirement process when shipyard capacity is unavailable to place them in a dry dock for nuclear-reactor defueling. Until space is available, the submarine and crew remain pier-side.

Without mitigation, GAO said 15 attack submarines will enter inactive idle time during fiscal years 2026 through 2030. The agency projected more than 14,000 inactive-idle days and more than $3.1 billion in operating and support costs for those submarines over that period.

The $3.1 billion figure is a projection, not spending that GAO says has already occurred. It represents the potential cost if the Navy does not reduce the time submarines awaiting decommissioning remain inactive.

Two recommendations remain open

GAO made two recommendations to the Department of the Navy. The first calls for a full evaluation of alternative ways to decommission attack submarines more efficiently and improve the use of shipyard capacity for the operational fleet. GAO identified options that could include defueling outside dry docks and reducing crews on submarines awaiting decommissioning.

The second recommendation calls for the Navy to use that evaluation to develop and implement an attack-submarine inactivation plan. The plan should include steps to achieve defined objectives and timeframes for monitoring and mitigating the risks associated with inactive idle time.

Both recommendations were listed as open when the report was released. The Navy verbally concurred with them but had not provided written comments.

Why the findings matter

The report is not a consumer safety alert or a finding that the submarines are unsafe. It concerns readiness and capacity: high-demand Navy platforms are unavailable while maintenance and retirement work compete for limited shipyard resources.

GAO said the Navy’s 44 attack submarines, as of fiscal year 2025, provide intelligence and strike capabilities and are among the assets most requested by combatant commanders. That makes the lost operational days significant beyond the accounting cost.

For taxpayers, the central issue is whether federal funds continue to support crews and vessels during periods when those assets are not delivering operational capability. The next accountability test is whether the Navy evaluates alternative defueling methods, produces a measurable inactivation plan and reports progress on reducing inactive idle time.

Readers should watch for written Navy comments, implementation milestones, changes in dry-dock capacity and any future GAO follow-up. The new report also adds to a longer GAO oversight record showing that attack-submarine maintenance delays have persisted across multiple reviews.

Sources

• GAO report: Navy Readiness — Actions Needed to Address Costly Attack Submarine Maintenance Challenges
• Reuters: Navy submarine maintenance delays cost $3.4 billion, GAO finds

The findings concern DOE’s Office of Environmental Management, which manages cleanup at 15 contaminated sites across the United States. The work includes radioactive-waste disposal, environmental remediation and activities tied to worker safety. DOE depends heavily on contractors for that mission: about 95 percent of EM’s annual $8 billion budget goes to contracting, supporting a contractor workforce of more than 25,000 employees.

GAO reviewed three contracts and associated field offices at Hanford, Idaho and Los Alamos. The sample was selected for factors including contract value and purpose and was not designed to represent every DOE contractor. The report therefore does not conclude that all contractors have ineffective assurance systems.

What GAO found

DOE requires certain contractors to maintain assurance systems intended to monitor performance, identify and report problems, complete corrective actions and provide the department with information for risk-informed oversight. But GAO found that neither DOE nor EM has defined system effectiveness or established specific, measurable criteria for field offices to use when evaluating it.

That left the selected field offices using different approaches. The Hanford and Idaho offices determined their systems were effective despite the lack of department-wide definitions and criteria. The Los Alamos office did not make an effectiveness determination.

At Hanford, the contractor’s review of issues between January 2022 and October 2023 found that nearly 40 percent of sampled issues in the two highest significance categories were improperly closed or insufficiently documented, according to GAO. The field office also reported poor work planning and conduct of operations that required formal requests for corrective-action plans.

At Idaho, the contractor reported 15 radiological events over an eight-month period that put personnel at risk of radiological overexposure, the report said. GAO did not state that workers were overexposed.

At Los Alamos, GAO described a widespread breakdown in the contractor’s training and qualification program in 2023 that led to a stop-work order. The interruption delayed nuclear-waste disposal and environmental-remediation work for 90 days. That is a historical example included in the August 26 report, not a new event.

Why the oversight gap matters

EM’s cleanup mission is expected to continue for decades. In April 2026, the office estimated that remaining work could last until 2100 and cost between $641 billion and $840 billion.

Those estimates make contractor oversight more than an administrative issue. Clear measures can help DOE compare performance, identify recurring weaknesses and determine when contract terms or other consequences should apply. Without shared definitions and metrics, GAO said, DOE and its field offices have less assurance that contractor-reported information supports consistent, risk-informed decisions.

The report does not say radioactive contamination escaped or that the public was harmed. Its concern is the quality of the systems used to detect, document and correct problems before they become more serious. The report also does not establish that workers were overexposed; it says the Idaho events put personnel at risk of radiological overexposure.

What happens next

GAO made four recommendations to EM. They call for defining contractor assurance-system effectiveness, establishing measurable evaluation criteria, explaining how EM will use field-office information in risk-informed oversight, creating oversight-assessment schedules and using contract mechanisms to communicate performance expectations and consequences.

DOE concurred with the recommendations, but all four remain open. GAO said it will update their status after confirming agency action. The report therefore does not represent a shutdown, funding cancellation or completed reform.

Readers should watch for whether DOE publishes a formal definition of an effective contractor assurance system and measurable evaluation criteria. Future changes to contract language, contractor performance evaluations and DOE oversight schedules will show whether the department’s response changes how long-term cleanup work is monitored.

Sources

• GAO report on DOE contractor assurance systems
• DOE Office of Environmental Management
• Daily Federal report on the GAO findings

GAO reissued the report on August 7, 2026, with additional context about recently introduced program-integrity legislation. The 20 programs accounted for about $1.1 trillion in federal obligations during fiscal year 2025, nearly 90% of comparable obligations among programs exceeding $100 million.

The finding concerns safeguards and documentation. It does not mean that the $1.1 trillion in obligations, or the broader $1.2 trillion in federal assistance, was stolen or improperly paid.

Programs reach households through states and other intermediaries

The federal programs reviewed by GAO include Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, disaster assistance, education, transportation, housing and community development. Benefits and grants may be distributed through state agencies, local governments, tribes, territories, schools, colleges, contractors, subrecipients and other nonfederal organizations.

GAO estimated that the federal government provided $1.2 trillion in assistance to state and local governments in fiscal year 2025. The $1.1 trillion figure for the 20 selected programs refers to federal obligations, which are commitments to spend money that may be paid during the same fiscal year or a later year.

That decentralized structure can help deliver services but also creates additional points where eligibility decisions, payments, contracting and oversight can break down.

What the five-versus-15 finding means

A fraud-risk assessment is a management tool. It helps an agency identify where fraud could occur, evaluate the likelihood and potential impact, and prioritize prevention, detection and response efforts.

Five of the 20 programs supplied documentation consistent with those leading practices. The remaining 15 did not provide comparable documented evidence. GAO said that group included programs with no assessment as well as programs for which agencies supplied limited or insufficient documentation.

The absence of a documented assessment does not establish that fraud occurred in a program. It does show that GAO could not find comparable evidence that most of the reviewed programs were systematically identifying and ranking their program-specific fraud risks.

Audit findings point to broader control weaknesses

GAO also identified severe and persistent single-audit findings in 18 of the 20 programs, using complete data from 2020 through 2024. Single audits examine how federal funds are managed by states, local governments and other recipients and whether required controls are working.

GAO describes severe and persistent findings as indicators that programs may lack safeguards to prevent, detect or respond to fraud. They are not equivalent to confirmed fraud. Examples cited in the report include inadequate verification of medical services, unauthorized access to Medicaid payment systems and weaknesses involving road and bridge materials.

Across the 18 programs with such findings, about 4% of nearly 90,000 single audits had severe and persistent findings. The rate varied widely by program, from about 0.3% to nearly 25%.

The report also identifies 22 open GAO recommendations related to fraud-risk management. Follow-up will show whether agencies document program-specific risks, improve data verification and analytics, and address weaknesses identified through audits.

Improper payments are a separate measure

In a separate analysis, GAO reported that 15 federal agencies estimated about $186 billion in improper payments across 64 programs in fiscal year 2025. That figure is not a fraud total. Improper payments can include payments made to the wrong recipient, in the wrong amount, or without enough documentation, and may result from administrative error as well as fraud.

GAO says the $186 billion estimate does not represent the full extent of government-wide improper payments. For example, the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program, or TANF, did not report an estimate even though about $16.5 billion was spent through the program in fiscal year 2025. The Department of Health and Human Services has said it lacks authority to obtain the information needed to estimate and report TANF improper payments.

What happens next

Congressional oversight and agency action will determine whether the documented gaps lead to stronger controls. H.R. 7155, the Stop Fraud in Federal Programs Act of 2026, was introduced in the House on January 20, 2026, and referred to the Judiciary Committee and the Education and Workforce Committee. It remains a proposal, not an enacted law.

For recipients, the report does not immediately change eligibility, benefit amounts or application procedures. For taxpayers and policymakers, the key questions are whether agencies close the 22 open recommendations, use information across programs and publicly document how they are reducing fraud risk without blocking eligible people from benefits and services.

Sources

• GAO fraud-risk report, reissued August 7, 2026
• Congress.gov, H.R. 7155

U.S. District Judge Indira Talwani of the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts issued the decision July 17, 2026, in State of New Jersey v. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-11816-IT.

The case was brought by 20 states, three governors and the District of Columbia. The opinion says the plaintiffs identified at least 1,180 active grants totaling more than $5.391 billion that could have been exposed to termination under the disputed interpretation of the federal rule.

What the court decided

The dispute centered on 2 C.F.R. § 200.340, a regulation governing when federal awards may be terminated. The provision allows an award to be terminated, “to the extent authorized by law,” if it “no longer effectuates the program goals or agency priorities.”

The states argued that the language refers to the goals and priorities communicated when a grant was awarded. Federal officials argued that agencies could rely on the provision after their priorities changed.

Talwani agreed with the states on that central question. The court declared that the 2024 version of the provision, 2 C.F.R. § 200.340(a)(4), and the comparable 2021 version, § 200.340(a)(2), do not permit agencies to terminate awards based on program goals or agency priorities identified after the grant was made.

The ruling does not prevent agencies from setting new priorities for future grant competitions. It requires that grantees be informed of the relevant program goals and agency priorities before an award is made.

Who brought the case

The states listed in the opinion are New Jersey, Massachusetts, New York, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont and Wisconsin.

The three governors who sued in their official capacities were Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania, Laura Kelly of Kansas and Andy Beshear of Kentucky. The District of Columbia also joined the case.

What funding was at stake

The opinion describes active grants involving a broad range of public programs. The states cited funding for public health, education, food assistance, scientific and medical research, clean drinking water, public safety and efforts to combat violent crime.

The court also discussed specific examples of grants that had already been terminated, including university awards, hate-crime prevention initiatives and an approximately $26 million Local Food for Schools and Child Care Cooperative Agreement award involving Illinois. Those examples were part of the case’s background, not awards automatically restored by the July 17 decision.

The more than $5.391 billion figure refers to active grants that the plaintiffs said were at risk. It is not a finding that every dollar would have been canceled or that all of the listed programs faced an immediate funding cutoff.

What the ruling does not do

The decision provides prospective legal protection, but it does not automatically restore grants that agencies already terminated. The opinion says the plaintiffs did not seek damages or other relief concerning previously terminated awards.

Those earlier cancellations may require separate administrative action or litigation. The decision also does not prohibit agencies from terminating grants for every possible reason. The regulation separately addresses situations such as a recipient’s failure to comply with award terms or a mutually agreed termination.

For an active grantee, the key change is narrower: an agency cannot rely on the challenged clause merely because officials later decide that a different set of priorities should govern an existing award.

What to watch next

The ruling is a district-court decision, not a Supreme Court judgment. The next major procedural questions are whether the federal government appeals, seeks a stay or files a motion concerning implementation. Separate disputes over individual grant cancellations also remain possible.

States, universities, schools, nonprofits, researchers and other recipients should review their award notices and agency communications. The decision may strengthen a challenge to a cancellation based only on a post-award shift in priorities, but it does not mean every federal funding dispute has been resolved.

Sources

• U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Memorandum & Order
• Arizona Attorney General coalition announcement
• Reuters report on the ruling

The report, published July 22, 2026, does not mean that most of the infrastructure, broadband and clean-energy funding was canceled. The agencies reported approving about 9,500 awards worth roughly $128 billion. GAO’s detailed review table lists $122.8 billion across 8,739 approved awards, plus modified awards that continued with changed terms or amounts.

The findings cover the Environmental Protection Agency, Department of the Interior, Department of Transportation and the Commerce Department’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration. Together, the four agencies received $628.4 billion in combined IIJA and IRA budget authority available during all or part of fiscal years 2022 through 2025. GAO said separate reports on the Department of Energy and Department of Agriculture are forthcoming.

What agencies reviewed

Beginning in January 2025, executive orders directed agencies to review IIJA and IRA funding for consistency with administration priorities. GAO found that agencies developed different processes, including searches for terms appearing in executive orders, such as “diversity” and “environmental justice.”

After review, awards could be approved without modification, modified with different terms or amounts, canceled, or left pending. GAO said senior agency leadership made final decisions, based on agency documentation and officials’ accounts.

GAO’s cancellation category is broader than a simple termination. It includes terminated awards, awards rescinded by law, previously announced awards that were withdrawn or retracted, and awards discontinued by recipients. The report does not characterize every canceled award as waste, fraud or an illegal action.

EPA and DOT accounted for most canceled dollars

EPA and DOT accounted for $16.4 billion, or more than 90%, of the canceled dollars reported by the four agencies. GAO said EPA’s Solar for All program accounted for about $7 billion, or roughly 39%, of the canceled total.

The largest unresolved pocket involved EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund. EPA announced on March 11, 2025, that it had terminated nearly $20 billion awarded to eight entities under the National Clean Investment Fund and Clean Communities Investment Accelerator programs.

GAO nevertheless counted that money as pending rather than definitively canceled. The agency’s records showed the grants as fully obligated as of March 2026, while litigation continued and undistributed funds remained frozen at the private bank serving as the programs’ financial agent. EPA says the grants were terminated; GAO said the final status was unclear in the records it received.

EPA has cited concerns about self-dealing, conflicts of interest, unqualified recipients and reduced oversight as its rationale for the termination. Those are EPA’s stated allegations and rationale, not independent findings established by GAO in this report. A separate EPA inspector general audit examined Solar for All and identified implementation and oversight issues, but it does not by itself resolve the broader GGRF dispute.

Why the totals are easy to misread

GAO cautioned that its review-status totals are not a single-day snapshot. The agencies supplied status information from different dates ranging from June 30, 2025, to February 25, 2026. The report found 796 canceled awards worth $17.8 billion and 2,528 pending awards worth $33.6 billion as of those varying dates.

The report also separates budget authority, obligations and disbursements. Budget authority is the amount Congress made available. An obligation is a legal commitment by the government to pay for an award or other authorized activity. A disbursement is the payment of that obligation.

For fiscal years 2022 through 2025, the four agencies obligated about 76% of their IIJA funding and disbursed about 54% of the obligated amount. For IRA funds at EPA, Interior and DOT, about 72% was obligated and about 60% of obligated funds was disbursed. Agency data also showed that Congress rescinded $6.4 billion in unobligated IRA funds in July 2025.

DOT’s June 30, 2026 funding update illustrates the difference. DOT reported about $510.8 billion in IIJA grants announced, $402.3 billion obligated and $244.7 billion outlayed. In other words, a public grant announcement is not the same as a binding federal commitment, and an obligation is not the same as cash already paid to a recipient.

That distinction matters for states, local governments, nonprofits and contractors. A project can be announced but not yet obligated, obligated but not fully paid, or placed under review before a recipient can confidently plan procurement, staffing, construction or expected services.

What the uncertainty means for recipients

States and local governments should confirm the status of each award with the responsible agency rather than rely on a broad program label. Nonprofits and contractors should check whether an award is approved, modified, obligated, outlayed, canceled or still pending, because each status can carry different consequences for contracts, hiring, financing, equipment purchases and project schedules.

The $33.6 billion pending figure should not be read as money definitively lost. It means that, in the agency data provided to GAO, no final decision had been reported. The outcome may differ by program, award document, litigation status and later agency action.

What happens next

Further developments are likely through agency status updates, congressional oversight and court proceedings involving EPA funds. GAO also said it plans separate reports on IIJA and IRA funding at the Department of Energy and Department of Agriculture, which were not included in this review.

Sources

• Government Accountability Office, Funding Status: Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and Inflation Reduction Act
• GAO full report GAO-26-108434
• U.S. Department of Transportation, IIJA Funding Status
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund

The report was issued August 7, four days before Vermont’s August 11 primary, and is based on publicly accessible records available through August 6. It found that 409 of 429 candidates — 95% — had registered with the Secretary of State’s Campaign Finance System.

A separate measure found that 368 candidates — 86% — had filed either an August 1 campaign-finance disclosure report or an under-threshold affidavit.

The distinction matters. Registration and periodic filing are separate requirements, so a candidate can be registered in the system and still have an outstanding filing.

County candidates had the largest filing gap

Filing-or-affidavit compliance varied by office. Statewide candidates and State Senate candidates were each at 100%. State Representative candidates were at 98%, while county candidates were at 71%.

The 71% county figure applies to the August 1 filing requirement. It is not the county registration rate, which was 92%.

The Secretary of State’s table lists 338 candidates who filed a full August 1 campaign-finance report and 30 who filed an under-threshold affidavit. It also lists 41 registered candidates who had not filed either document by the August 6 cutoff.

Those 41 included one State Senate candidate, 18 State Representative candidates and 22 county candidates. Another 20 candidates had not registered: 12 State Representative candidates and eight county candidates.

The report does not establish that any candidate intentionally violated the law or is legally liable. It is a status snapshot based on records available at the stated cutoff, and later filings can change an individual candidate’s status. The report also notes that some independent and minor-party candidacies could have been filed after the comparison data was assembled.

What candidates must file

For the offices covered by the report, Vermont requires candidates for statewide office, the General Assembly and county offices to register in the Campaign Finance System. Candidates who raise or spend at least $500 during the election cycle generally must file disclosure reports. The reporting requirement also applies when a campaign carries forward surplus funds from a previous cycle, even if it has no new activity.

A campaign that remains below $500 and carries no surplus may attest through an under-threshold affidavit instead. That affidavit is not a detailed accounting of contributions and expenditures; it certifies that the campaign does not have activity requiring a full disclosure report.

The August 7 report said 86% of candidates complied with the August 1 filing requirement, up from 80% for the July 1 requirement. A July 23 Vermont Public report used an earlier July 1 snapshot and found 337 compliant candidates out of 422. The reports used different cutoff dates and candidate totals, so they are not directly contradictory.

How voters can check a candidate

Voters can use the Secretary of State’s online Campaign Finance System to search filed disclosure reports, under-threshold affidavits and mass-media reports. The system also provides filing lists and searches by reporting period or reporting entity.

Checking both registration and filing status can provide a clearer picture than checking only whether a candidate appears in the system. A registered candidate may still have missed a required periodic filing, while an affidavit generally indicates that the campaign remained below the reporting threshold and had no carried-over surplus.

More deadlines are ahead

The next major campaign-finance deadlines for Vermont’s 2026 statewide election cycle are September 1, October 1 and October 15. Additional reports are due the Friday before the November 3 general election, two weeks after the election and December 15.

Reports are due by 11:59 p.m. on the deadline. Each reporting period generally cuts off three days before the filing date, so transactions after that cutoff appear on the next report.

Possible enforcement is separate from the report

Members of the public may submit campaign-finance complaints through the state’s enforcement process. The Vermont Attorney General and state’s attorneys have civil investigative authority when they have reason to believe campaign-finance law may have been violated.

Vermont law allows civil penalties of up to $10,000 for each violation. That potential penalty does not mean every candidate listed as missing a filing has received a final enforcement finding. The Secretary of State’s report identifies registration and filing statuses as of August 6; it does not determine intent, fraud or liability.

Sources

• Vermont Campaign Finance Transparency Report, August 7, 2026
• Vermont Public: Vt. political candidates flouting campaign finance laws, report finds

That is the central finding of a Government Accountability Office assessment published and publicly released July 21, 2026. GAO said many federal programs lack clearly defined, measurable goals, relevant outcome data and enough rigorous evaluation to determine whether services are improving people’s lives.

Spending and participation are not the same as results

Agencies commonly report outputs such as how much money a program spends, how many people it serves or how many applications it processes. Those measures can show activity, but they do not necessarily show whether a program improved health, increased safety, helped families recover or solved the problem it was designed to address.

GAO distinguishes ongoing performance management from more rigorous program evaluation. Regular monitoring can provide an early warning that a program is falling short. Impact evaluations can help determine whether the program itself caused a measurable change by comparing results with what would have happened without it.

GAO said that in a 2020 survey, about one-third of federal managers reported having access to robust evaluations to help manage their programs. Without useful goals, reliable data and stronger evaluations, agencies and Congress have less basis for deciding what should be expanded, changed or ended.

A selected review found gaps across three agencies

GAO’s 2026 review of 15 federal programs serving pregnant women, children through age 5 and their families found that 12 had established performance-management processes. Three did not: one program at the Department of Agriculture, one at the Department of Health and Human Services, and one at the Department of Veterans Affairs.

The finding applies to that selected group of programs, not to all federal programs. It does, however, illustrate the broader problem GAO identified: agencies may be collecting information without having a consistent way to connect that information to the outcomes they are expected to achieve.

Why the measurement problem matters to Congress

Weak measurement limits congressional oversight. Lawmakers may know how much a program costs and how many people receive assistance, but have difficulty judging whether the program is delivering value or whether another approach would work better.

It also makes overlap harder to identify. Related programs can serve similar populations or pursue similar goals across different agencies. If those agencies use unclear goals, incomplete data or incompatible measures, comparing performance and streamlining efforts becomes more difficult.

The affected areas include services Americans rely on for health care, public safety and disaster support. GAO’s report does not establish that those programs are ineffective. It says agencies often cannot reliably determine how effective they are.

Implementation gaps extend beyond individual programs

A separate GAO report published June 23, 2026, found that the Office of Management and Budget and four selected agencies had not fully implemented new requirements under the Federal Agency Performance Act of 2024.

GAO said OMB’s guidance did not fully address several statutory requirements for strategic reviews, including requirements involving agency leaders and stakeholders. The Departments of Homeland Security and the Treasury had procedures addressing most, but not all, requirements; the Department of State and the General Services Administration had not developed the required process documents. None of the four selected agencies had fully implemented the new strategic-review requirements.

The review covered selected agencies rather than every federal agency. Together with the July assessment, it points to a broader management challenge: rules can require agencies to set goals and review performance, but the process is less useful when goals are vague, data are incomplete or evaluations are limited.

Fraud risks add another accountability concern

GAO’s fraud-risk report, reissued with revisions Aug. 7, provides related context. The broader category of federally funded, state-administered programs received an estimated $1.2 trillion in fiscal 2025. GAO’s review of 20 programs representing about $1.1 trillion in federal obligations found that 15 lacked documented evidence consistent with identifying fraud risks and assessing their likelihood to prioritize action.

That finding does not mean fraud occurred in all 15 programs. It means GAO did not find documented evidence of the specified risk-assessment work for those programs. The report reinforces why documentation, data and regular reviews matter when public money moves through complex federal and state systems.

What to watch next

The next accountability test is whether agencies act on GAO’s recommendations, improve performance-review guidance and conduct stronger evaluations. GAO recommended that OMB revise its guidance and that the selected agencies improve their strategic-review documentation; the recommendations remained open when GAO published its report.

Readers should also watch whether Congress uses clearer outcome information when it reviews funding for health care, food assistance, public safety and disaster programs.

For taxpayers, the practical issue is straightforward: a program can show that money was spent and people were served while still leaving unanswered whether the intended public benefit was achieved.

Sources

• GAO: Federal Programs — Assessing and Improving Effectiveness
• Federal News Network: The government needs to do more to measure agency performance

GAO published and publicly released report GAO-26-108615 on August 6, 2026. The review examined savings data for contracts, grants and leases reported on DOGE’s Wall of Receipts from January 20, 2025, through July 7, 2026. DOGE’s $110 billion figure was its own reported estimate, not a GAO-verified measure of federal spending reductions.

GAO found problems with DOGE’s methods

GAO said DOGE was not sufficiently transparent about how it calculated savings. For most reported contract savings, the watchdog found that DOGE did not use the methodology described on its website.

Grant claims presented a separate documentation problem. GAO said it lacked enough information to verify the method behind 96% of the reported grant savings. The Wall of Receipts also did not explain how savings from terminated leases were calculated.

GAO did not independently audit every item on the Wall of Receipts. Its review assessed DOGE’s methodologies and disclosures and examined selected contracts, grants and leases. The findings do not establish that every DOGE claim was false, but they show that the public ledger often did not provide enough supporting information to determine whether a reported cancellation produced an actual reduction in obligations, scope, funding or future spending.

Some lease terminations were already underway

GAO reviewed 264 leases listed by DOGE as terminated. The audit found that 108 were already in the process of being terminated when DOGE was established.

GAO attributed about $15.3 million of the $53.5 million in reported lease savings to those leases. A lease appearing on a termination list therefore does not necessarily mean the action was newly initiated by DOGE or that the full reported amount represents additional savings.

The finding illustrates why timing and documentation matter when agencies claim credit for reductions in federal spending. Congress, contractors and taxpayers need to know whether an action was newly initiated, already planned or simply recorded after the fact.

A $1.7 billion contract example

The audit identified a Defense Health Agency information-technology contract that DOGE listed as producing $1.7 billion in savings.

GAO found that the contract was not terminated and that its scope, value and funding were not reduced. The watchdog therefore concluded that no savings were achieved on that contract.

GAO presented the contract as a specific example from its review, not as proof that all contract entries on the Wall of Receipts were unsupported. The broader concern was whether the savings figures could be independently checked using the information DOGE made public.

What happens next

GAO issued one recommendation, and its status remained open. It called on the Executive Office of the President, through the U.S. DOGE Service, to prominently disclose known limitations in the quality of the data used for the savings ledger.

GAO said the U.S. DOGE Service did not provide comments or respond to requests for information and interviews during the review. As of July 7, 2026, the Wall of Receipts remained live without updates explaining its savings methodology or disclosing the data limitations identified by GAO.

For taxpayers, the practical question is not simply how many contracts, grants or leases appear on a cancellation list. It is whether those actions reduced actual federal obligations or future spending. Readers should watch for changes to the Wall of Receipts, agency responses, congressional scrutiny and documentation showing the amount of spending reductions ultimately realized.

Sources

• U.S. Government Accountability Office audit report
• Associated Press report
• U.S. DOGE Service Wall of Receipts

The change gives the city’s civilian police-oversight body direct access to police records systems. PERA is expected to use that access to investigate misconduct allegations, audit internal-affairs investigations and review police policies.

Mayor Brett Smiley was expected to sign the ordinance within 10 days of the council vote. The available sources do not confirm the exact date of any mayoral signature or when the expanded technical access will begin.

What the ordinance changes

The ordinance does not merely authorize PERA to request records. It provides direct access to police-department records systems, including body-worn-camera video, for the oversight authority’s investigative and review work.

That distinction matters because body-camera footage and other police records can be central to reviewing an alleged incident, evaluating an internal-affairs investigation or assessing whether department policies are working as intended. The approved sources describe the authority granted by the ordinance, but they do not provide implementation protocols or a technical schedule for access.

The council’s unanimous vote made the ordinance a final legislative action by the city council. It did not, by itself, establish that a particular officer committed misconduct or produce a disciplinary result. No new finding or disciplinary outcome is reported in the approved source packet.

Background on the oversight dispute

PERA’s executive director had previously sought fuller access to police records and said the department had repeatedly obstructed investigations. That is PERA’s position, not an adjudicated finding that the department violated the authority’s rules or the law.

A PERA press release from July 18, 2025, documented the authority’s stated concerns about access, cooperation and its ability to fulfill its oversight responsibilities. A separate PERA review memo, published Aug. 21, 2025, describes PERA’s role as Providence’s civilian police-oversight body and identifies the materials used in its work, including police reports, memoranda, body-camera video and witness interviews.

The council’s action therefore addresses a dispute over the practical ability of civilian oversight to examine police conduct. With direct system access, PERA’s work will no longer depend in the same way on individual records requests or the department’s process for providing materials. The sources do not establish how often access was delayed, how many investigations were affected or whether the new authority will change the outcome of any past case.

What happens next

The next known step was the expected mayoral review and signature within 10 days after the June 4 vote. After that, the ordinance’s practical effect will depend on implementation, including how PERA receives access to the department’s systems and how records are handled during investigations, audits and policy reviews.

For Providence, the immediate change is institutional: the civilian oversight authority has been approved for a more direct role in examining police records and body-camera evidence. The longer-term effect remains unknown because the approved sources do not report a completed investigation, disciplinary decision or implementation date under the amended ordinance.

The unresolved question is whether the controls required by that memorandum are advancing at the same pace.

National Security Presidential Memorandum 11 directs the Department of War and intelligence agencies to accelerate national-security AI adoption while producing new rules for autonomous weapons, governance, procurement, security, training and testing. As of August 5, 2026, the public record reviewed does not confirm that the memorandum’s first required policy updates have been completed.

What the memorandum requires

NSPM-11 gives the Secretary of War 90 days to issue an update to Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, the directive governing autonomy in weapon systems. That makes September 3, 2026, the first major checkpoint.

The memorandum also requires the Committee on National Security Systems and the Office of Management and Budget, working with other national-security officials, to issue an AI governance policy and a classified annex within the same 90-day period. Within 120 days, it calls for additional work on procurement, access to computing capacity, industry security, data exchanges, training, risk management and testing. Those deadlines fall on October 3, 2026.

These are requirements and deadlines, not evidence that the resulting policies are already in force. The White House memorandum does not by itself establish that the Department of War or other agencies have completed the required documents.

Deployment is already expanding

In a May 1 announcement, the Department of War said it had reached agreements with eight companies—SpaceX, OpenAI, Google, NVIDIA, Reflection, Microsoft, Amazon Web Services and Oracle—to deploy artificial-intelligence capabilities on classified networks.

The department also said more than 1.3 million personnel had used GenAI.mil during its first five months, generating tens of millions of prompts and deploying hundreds of thousands of AI agents.

A separate AI Acceleration Strategy describes three major efforts: Agent Network for AI-enabled battle management and decision support, GenAI.mil for department-wide access to frontier models, and Enterprise Agents for secure workflow deployment. The strategy also includes artificial-intelligence infrastructure and workforce initiatives.

The department’s announcements document expanding access and experimentation. They do not, by themselves, show that the programs satisfy NSPM-11’s procurement, governance or testing requirements.

The company count has differed across accounts. The Department of War’s May 1 release lists eight companies, while an Associated Press report described a separate seven-company arrangement and noted that Anthropic was absent from the department’s list. The accounts should not be treated as identical without additional documentation.

Why Directive 3000.09 matters

Directive 3000.09 is central to the debate because it addresses how autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems are developed, tested and used. The safeguards discussed in the directive and related oversight include human judgment, geographic limits, termination procedures, reliability and robustness testing, and protection against adversarial manipulation.

The pending update has drawn congressional scrutiny. In a June 12 letter, Sen. Ruben Gallego questioned whether a compressed rewrite could weaken human judgment, shorten testing, or increase risks involving friendly fire and civilian harm. He also asked about coordination with allies and protections for civilians in host nations.

Gallego’s letter is an oversight document and a set of questions, not a finding that wrongdoing has occurred. The available records also do not establish that autonomous weapons are currently operating without human control or that a specific deployment failure has occurred.

Inspectors are reviewing open recommendations

On June 29, the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, using the secondary title Department of War Inspector General, opened a follow-up evaluation of open recommendations concerning AI policy, governance, acquisition and implementation procedures.

The memorandum says the review will examine the status of recommendations from earlier evaluations, including work involving AI governance and acquisition. It also states that the use of the Department of War title does not change the Department of Defense’s statutory name, authorities or the inspector general’s responsibilities.

The evaluation is an active oversight action, not a final compliance finding. Its eventual conclusions could help clarify whether existing controls, acquisition practices and governance arrangements match the department’s expanding AI use.

What remains unknown

As of August 5, the public sources reviewed do not verify publication of the revised Directive 3000.09, the national-security AI governance policy, or the classified annex required by NSPM-11. Public records also do not establish whether the department’s announced programs have completed the memorandum’s related testing, risk-management, procurement and reporting steps.

Many details may remain classified, but the existence, status or public confirmation of the required policy documents would still be an important accountability marker.

What to watch next

September 3 will be the first visible test of whether deployment and oversight are moving together. Readers should watch for confirmation of the revised Directive 3000.09, the national-security AI governance policy, the status of its classified annex, and provisions governing human oversight, testing, geographic limits, termination and system robustness.

October 3 is the next major checkpoint for procurement, industry-security, data-exchange, training, risk-management and testing deliverables.

The issue reaches beyond classified facilities. Military AI decisions can affect servicemembers, allied forces, civilians in conflict zones, contractors, technology companies and taxpayers. The immediate public question is not whether the government is using AI. Official records show that it is. The accountability question is what documented safeguards and independent reviews accompany that use.

Sources

• National Security Presidential Memorandum/NSPM-11 — The White House
• Classified Networks AI Agreements — U.S. Department of War
• Follow-up Evaluation on Artificial Intelligence Recommendations — Inspector General
• U.S. military and 7 companies make deals to use AI in classified systems — Associated Press

The proposed maximum would equal $30,600 annually per councilmember before any future inflation adjustments. Those adjustments would be tied to the California Consumer Price Index and capped at 5% per year.

What Measure A asks voters to approve

The measure would amend Section 3.05 of the Roseville City Charter. The ballot question asks whether the current $600 monthly compensation, established by voters in 2000, should be replaced with compensation of no more than $2,550 per month.

The proposed charter language would also authorize annual CPI-based adjustments, subject to the 5% yearly limit. The $2,550 figure is a maximum under the proposal; it would not become available unless voters approve the measure.

Why the measure must go to voters

Roseville’s city charter establishes council compensation, so the City Council cannot change the amount by itself. The city’s election materials say a charter amendment requires voter approval.

The current $600 monthly amount has remained unchanged since voters approved it in 2000. Roseville’s election materials say the proposal responds to inflation, population growth and expanded municipal responsibilities.

A March 20, 2024, council record shows the council discussed compensation and directed staff to return with a future ballot measure. That earlier discussion contemplated a charter amendment requiring voter approval, increased monthly compensation and no city-paid health benefits.

How the proposed pay compares with current compensation

Under the existing charter provision, councilmembers receive $600 per month, or $7,200 per year. The proposed maximum of $2,550 per month would equal $30,600 per year.

If the maximum were used, the difference would be up to $1,950 per month, or $23,400 per year, before any later CPI adjustment. The measure would set a ceiling rather than guarantee that every councilmember would receive the maximum amount.

What would not change

Measure A would not add city-paid medical, dental or vision benefits. Roseville’s current compensation page says councilmembers receive no insurance benefits, and the ballot materials say that would continue under the proposed amendment.

Reasonable and necessary expense reimbursements would remain separate from salary. Reimbursements for city business would not be included when determining councilmember compensation under the proposed language.

Why the city says it proposed the change

Roseville’s election materials cite inflation, population growth and the broader range of services overseen by the city as reasons for placing the measure on the ballot. The city also says the proposed amount could make council service more accessible to a broader range of residents.

Those statements describe the city’s rationale for the proposal. They do not change the central question facing voters: whether to amend the charter’s compensation provision.

What Roseville voters should review

The official election page includes the ballot question, proposed charter language, the city attorney’s impartial analysis, and filed arguments and rebuttals. Voters can review those materials before the November 3, 2026, general municipal election.

Bottom line: Roseville council compensation remains $600 per month unless voters approve Measure A. If adopted, the charter amendment would allow compensation of no more than $2,550 per month, permit CPI adjustments capped at 5% annually, and continue the absence of city-paid health insurance benefits.

Sources

• Measure A election page
• City Council Compensation
• Roseville City Council meeting minutes, March 20, 2024

The VA Office of Inspector General issued its review on July 24, 2026, after examining a statistical sample of about 1,600 fiduciary misuse-allegation cases completed from April 2024 through March 2025. Follow-up testing found that the problems persisted in a sample reviewed through February 28, 2026.

Investigators found date errors and missed investigations

The OIG estimated that staff recorded the wrong earliest allegation date in about 350 cases, or roughly 22% of the cases reviewed. The average discrepancy was at least 19 days. One sampled case was recorded 110 days after the allegation was received; the report also describes a separate case in which the recorded date was 214 days late.

The report also found that allegations were not consistently advanced for investigation. Of an estimated 960 cases in which staff decided an investigation was unnecessary, the OIG concluded that about 240, or 25%, should have been investigated under the program manual.

The figures for 350 and 240 cases are statistical projections from the review sample, not a complete case-by-case count. They do not establish that every affected beneficiary lost money or that every case closed without an investigation involved actual misuse.

A decision to investigate is not a finding that misuse occurred. The investigation is intended to determine whether misuse took place and what response may be appropriate.

Why the process broke down

The OIG attributed the weaknesses to unclear language in the VA Fiduciary Program Manual, confusion about the evidentiary threshold for opening an investigation and the use of provisions that applied to other parts of the fiduciary process.

According to the report, some staff treated the higher standard used to make a final misuse determination as though it were required before an investigation could begin. The manual instead directs staff to advance a credible allegation unless there is clear evidence that it has no basis in fact.

The watchdog also cited the absence of systematic national monitoring of misuse allegations. Without consistent quality reviews across the program, the report said, VA lacked a reliable way to identify recurring errors and correct them.

The program’s scale

The Veterans Benefits Administration Fiduciary Program served nearly 103,000 beneficiaries in fiscal year 2025. Those beneficiaries collectively received almost $2.8 billion in VA payments managed through fiduciaries.

VA reissued more than $5 million to beneficiaries in fiscal year 2025 after determining that fiduciaries had not used the money for beneficiaries’ well-being. The OIG’s findings concern the process for handling allegations and deciding whether to investigate, not a conclusion that all cases reviewed involved confirmed misuse.

What VA agreed to do

VBA concurred with all four OIG recommendations. The recommendations call for clearer manual language, better guidance on red-flag indicators, clearer training on the evidentiary standard for starting an investigation and a national quality-review program.

As of July 24, recommendation 4, concerning a national quality-review program, was closed. Recommendations 1 through 3 remained open. The OIG said it will close those recommendations after VBA provides sufficient evidence that it has addressed the risks identified in the report.

As of May 26, VBA had developed a national misuse quality-assurance program but had not yet implemented it, according to the report. The near-term question is whether the department can show that the revised procedures, training and reviews are operating effectively.

What beneficiaries and families can do

Veterans or survivors whose benefits are managed by a fiduciary should keep records of suspected misuse, missing funds, unpaid necessities and unexplained withdrawals. Useful documentation can include account statements, receipts, notices, correspondence and a timeline showing when concerns were reported.

The VA OIG report says the program manual generally requires staff to review a credible allegation and advance it for investigation unless there is clear evidence that it has no basis in fact. Proof of misuse is not required merely to start an investigation.

For questions about a VA fiduciary, the OIG hotline’s guidance directs people to contact a VA Fiduciary Hub at 1-888-407-0144. Suspected fraud, waste or abuse involving VA programs can be reported to the VA OIG hotline at 1-800-488-8244. Complainants may choose to remain confidential or anonymous, although anonymous reports limit the OIG’s ability to obtain additional information.

The OIG’s follow-up on the three open recommendations will show whether VBA’s response has addressed the weaknesses identified in the review.

Sources

• VA OIG fiduciary misuse allegation review, July 24, 2026
• VA OIG report page: Review of the Fiduciary Program’s Misuse Allegation Process

That is the central finding of a Government Accountability Office assessment published July 21, 2026. GAO said many federal programs still lack clearly defined goals, useful performance measures and relevant data, limiting Congress’s and agency leaders’ ability to judge results.

The assessment covers programs tied to health care, public safety, disaster support, food assistance and veterans’ services. It does not conclude that every program is ineffective. Rather, it says decision-makers often do not have enough information to determine which programs are producing their intended results.

Spending and participation are not the same as results

GAO distinguishes among three kinds of information agencies use to manage programs.

Inputs are resources, such as federal funding, staff or equipment. Outputs are activities or services delivered, such as the number of people receiving benefits or disaster claims processed. Outcomes show whether conditions improved—for example, whether a public-safety effort reduced a risk or whether assistance produced better health or economic results.

Inputs and outputs can show that a program is operating. They do not, by themselves, establish that it is achieving its public purpose.

GAO said programs often lack measurable goals or the data needed to assess progress. Without those elements, agencies cannot reliably identify what needs to change, and Congress has less evidence when deciding whether to continue, revise or redirect funding.

Why the gap matters across government

Federal programs often operate alongside related efforts at the same agency or at other agencies. When programs do not define goals consistently or collect comparable performance information, policymakers have a harder time determining which approaches work better or whether efforts are unnecessarily fragmented.

GAO describes incomplete effectiveness information as a risk that can contribute to waste and inefficiency. It is not proof of fraud, unlawful spending or failure by every program. Better performance information can help policymakers coordinate related programs, target resources and identify services that need improvement.

GAO’s 2026 annual report on duplication, overlap and fragmentation identified a lack of consistent information on program effectiveness among the risks that can accompany poorly managed related programs. The report also said congressional and agency action on earlier recommendations had produced financial and operational benefits, while hundreds of matters remained open.

Three programs still need fuller performance systems

A more specific example comes from a GAO review published May 5, 2026. GAO examined 15 federal programs at five agencies that provide some amount of direct services solely to pregnant women, children through age 5, or their families.

Twelve of the 15 had federal performance-management processes that set goals, collected information and used it to assess results. GAO recommended that the remaining three programs fully develop those processes: the Preschool Development Grants Birth Through Five Program at the Department of Health and Human Services, the WIC Farmers Market Nutrition Program at the Department of Agriculture, and the Veterans Health Administration Maternity Care Coordinator Program at the Department of Veterans Affairs.

All three recommendations were listed as open in the review. HHS disagreed with its recommendation, USDA neither agreed nor disagreed, and VA agreed and said it anticipated completing a federal-level process by October 2026. Those positions and target dates are not the same as completed reforms.

The review also found that the 15 programs were fragmented across five agencies and overlapped to some extent, but GAO said they were not duplicative because they differed in beneficiary characteristics or services. GAO said completing the performance processes could help agencies assess results, identify potential improvements and target resources more appropriately.

What improvement can look like

GAO points to the Department of Homeland Security’s Securing the Cities program as an example of progress after oversight recommendations. The program helps state and local governments detect and deter nuclear terrorism.

In 2019, GAO found that DHS lacked information to fully track cities’ use of program funds or assess performance. In a 2024 review, GAO found that the program had established goals, performance measures and milestones and was conducting quarterly financial assessments. GAO said those changes put DHS in a better position to monitor performance and identify needed actions.

That example shows the value of performance management, but GAO also says additional evidence may be needed to determine whether a program is actually effective. Process evaluations examine whether a program is being implemented as intended. Outcome evaluations examine whether activities are aligned with desired results and whether changes are consistent with program goals. Impact evaluations compare results with what would have happened without the program.

The broader management problem

A separate GAO report published June 23 found that the Office of Management and Budget and four selected agencies had not fully implemented new requirements under the Federal Agency Performance Act of 2024.

GAO said OMB’s 2025 guidance did not fully address several statutory requirements for agency strategic reviews, including requirements involving senior leaders, stakeholders and annual reporting. GAO also found that none of the four selected agencies had fully implemented the new strategic-review requirements. The recommendations to OMB and the selected agencies were listed as open.

The federal performance framework calls for strategic goals, measurable priorities and regular, data-driven reviews. The next test will be whether agencies turn those requirements into usable evidence about outcomes—not simply reports on money spent and services delivered.

What readers should watch

For taxpayers, beneficiaries and lawmakers, the practical question is not only whether a program spends its money or reaches participants. It is whether agencies can show that the program is improving the conditions it was designed to address.

Watch for OMB guidance, agency strategic reviews, congressional oversight and updates on the three open recommendations involving HHS, USDA and VA. Evidence that agencies add measurable outcome goals, usable data and independent evaluations would show movement from activity reporting toward stronger accountability.

Sources

• GAO assessment on federal program effectiveness
• Performance.gov federal performance framework