The investigations followed an Israel Defense Forces review of approximately 150 incidents by its General Staff Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism. Opening a criminal investigation is not a finding of wrongdoing, a charge or a conviction. The practical test will be whether investigators identify suspects, prosecutors bring charges or authorities publish findings that answer the families’ questions.

What changed on August 19

The IDF said its Military Police Criminal Investigation Division would investigate the two cases after military prosecutors reviewed the fact-finding material. The announcement also said three other incidents would not receive criminal investigations: the April 2024 strike that killed seven World Central Kitchen employees and two incidents involving Médecins Sans Frontières employees.

The IDF presented the announcement as part of its domestic legal and military review process. It did not say that the two investigations had already established criminal liability.

The Hind Rajab case

The IDF said that on January 29, 2024, troops fired at a vehicle carrying members of the Hamada family in Gaza City. According to the military’s account, five passengers were killed and two survived: Hind Rajab and her cousin Layan Hamada.

The IDF said that, after a call to rescue authorities, the movement of a Palestine Red Crescent ambulance was coordinated to evacuate the casualties. It said allegations that a shell struck the ambulance, killing the two paramedics aboard, led to the decision to open a criminal investigation. The bodies of seven family members, including Hind and Layan, and the two paramedics were later recovered.

The case drew international attention after recordings captured Hind and Layan seeking help while gunfire could be heard around them. The IDF’s announcement acknowledged fire toward the family vehicle and the ambulance but said its criminal investigation would determine the relevant facts and responsibility.

The March 2025 deaths of emergency responders

The second investigation concerns three shooting incidents in the Tel al-Sultan area on March 23, 2025. The IDF said troops conducting an ambush against Hamas operatives fired at vehicles they believed were associated with Hamas. The vehicles were later identified as a fire truck, ambulances and a Palestinian U.N. vehicle.

Fifteen Palestinians were killed, including medical personnel and paramedics. The IDF’s fact-finding mechanism said six of those killed were identified as belonging to Hamas, while also concluding that the firing raised a reasonable suspicion of criminal misconduct. The IDF said the decision to investigate was based on that finding.

The military also said troops later crushed the vehicles and covered the bodies with metal mesh. Those details are part of the IDF’s own published account of the incident; the criminal investigation is intended to examine whether individual conduct amounted to an offense.

Fact-finding is not a criminal case

The General Staff Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism and the Military Police Criminal Investigation Division have different roles. According to the IDF, the FFAM conducts factual assessments of exceptional operational incidents. Its work can help commanders decide on operational or disciplinary consequences and can provide material to military prosecutors considering whether a criminal investigation is warranted.

A Military Police criminal investigation is a separate evidentiary process. Investigators may question witnesses, collect records and examine whether individual conduct may constitute a criminal offense. Prosecutors then decide whether the evidence supports further action, including possible charges. The opening of an investigation does not determine the outcome.

Three other Gaza cases were not referred

The IDF said it would not open criminal investigations into three other incidents reviewed through the same process.

One involved the April 1, 2024 strike on a World Central Kitchen convoy in Deir al-Balah that killed seven employees. The military said its review found serious failures, leading to the removal of two officers and reprimands for three commanders. It nevertheless concluded that the commanders’ decisions did not raise a reasonable suspicion of criminal misconduct.

The other two cases involved Médecins Sans Frontières employees. One concerned a February 20, 2024 strike on an MSF building in Khan Younis that killed two women and injured seven people. The other involved November 18, 2023 gunfire near an MSF convoy in Gaza City, in which two passengers were allegedly killed. The IDF said neither case met the threshold for a criminal investigation, while identifying operational faults or gaps.

The absence of a criminal investigation does not, by itself, establish that an incident was lawful. It reflects the military prosecution’s assessment of the available evidence and the legal threshold it applied.

Why families and aid groups remain skeptical

Rajab’s family and the Palestine Red Crescent Society have called for an independent international inquiry. In an Associated Press interview, Hind’s mother said the Israeli investigation was insufficient and questioned why the acknowledgment of the shootings and the decision to investigate came more than two years after the deaths.

The Red Crescent and other humanitarian organizations have also raised concerns about delay, transparency and whether an internal military process can independently examine the conduct of military personnel. Those concerns are not a legal finding about the new investigations, but they are central to whether families and aid groups will regard the results as credible.

The broader record adds to that skepticism. The Associated Press reported in August 2026 that a year after Israeli strikes on Nasser Hospital in Khan Younis killed 22 Palestinians, including journalists and rescue workers, no one had been held accountable. The Israeli military said that case remained under review and had not provided a public timeline for deciding whether to open a criminal investigation.

How international accountability fits

The new Israeli proceedings do not automatically halt international scrutiny. A 2026 report by the U.N. Independent International Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/62/22, urged transparent investigations and domestic or universal-jurisdiction proceedings in the broader context of unlawful violence and accountability in the occupied Palestinian territory and Israel. The report is broader than the two newly opened IDF investigations and is not a judgment on their merits.

The International Criminal Court’s Palestine situation is likewise a separate legal process. In a November 21, 2024 decision, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber I rejected Israel’s jurisdictional challenges and stated that the court’s territorial jurisdiction in the situation extends to Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. That procedural decision concerned the court’s jurisdiction and related proceedings; it did not adjudicate the two incidents covered by the August 2026 IDF announcement.

Domestic investigations can affect how international bodies assess whether national systems are genuinely investigating particular allegations. They do not automatically remove the possibility of international action, especially when the scope, independence, timing and results of domestic proceedings remain contested.

What to watch next

The next meaningful developments are likely to be investigative findings, prosecutorial decisions and any disclosure of suspects or charges. Families, humanitarian groups and journalists may continue seeking records or independent inquiries even where the IDF declines to open a criminal case.

For now, the August 19 announcement marks a procedural change, not a final judgment on what happened or who bears criminal responsibility. Its credibility will depend on whether the investigations produce verifiable evidence, identifiable decisions and an account that can withstand scrutiny beyond the military institution that initiated them.

Sources

• Israel Defense Forces: Criminal Investigation Decisions Regarding Five Incidents
• Associated Press: Israeli military launches criminal probes into killings of Hind Rajab and Palestinian paramedics
• U.N. Commission of Inquiry: Report A/HRC/62/22
• International Criminal Court: Palestine jurisdictional decision

Her comments followed an August 18 action by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, or OFAC, which added Akane, a Japanese national, and Abdoulaye Seye, a Senegalese national and senior trial lawyer, to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List. The move expanded the dispute from U.S. objections to particular ICC investigations into direct pressure on the court’s leadership.

What the United States did

OFAC’s August 18 notice lists both officials under the ICC-related sanctions program created by Executive Order 14203. Under that order, property and interests in property in the United States, later brought into the United States, or held by or under the control of a U.S. person are blocked. U.S. persons generally may not transfer, pay, export, withdraw or otherwise deal in that blocked property.

The order also prohibits the provision or receipt of funds, goods or services by, to or for the benefit of a blocked person, subject to applicable licenses and exceptions. The entry of covered ICC officials, employees and agents, as well as immediate family members in specified circumstances, is suspended unless the secretary of state makes an exception.

OFAC issued General License 12 on the same day. The license authorizes a limited wind-down of certain transactions involving people blocked on August 18 under stated conditions. It does not remove the designations or create permission for unrestricted dealings.

Why Washington says it acted

The Trump administration says the ICC exceeded its authority by investigating or pursuing cases involving U.S. and Israeli personnel. Executive Order 14203 says the United States and Israel are not parties to the Rome Statute and argues that ICC actions threaten U.S. sovereignty, national security and foreign-policy interests.

Those are the administration’s policy and legal claims, not findings from a court in this sanctions action. The measures target named officials; they are not criminal convictions, rulings on the merits of an ICC case or sanctions against the ICC as an institution.

How the ICC and its supporters responded

The ICC called the action a “flagrant attack” on its independence and said threats against judicial actors place the international legal order at risk. The court said it would continue to discharge its mandate independently and impartially.

Japan’s Foreign Ministry said on August 19 that the designation of Akane was “very unfortunate.” It reaffirmed Japan’s support for the ICC’s work to prosecute the most serious international crimes and uphold the rule of law, while saying Tokyo would continue communicating with relevant countries.

Akane later urged Japan to persuade Washington not to escalate further and to encourage ICC member states not to withdraw under U.S. pressure. Japan is a major ICC member and Akane’s home country, giving the dispute a diplomatic dimension beyond Washington and The Hague.

U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres was also seriously concerned, according to a U.N. spokesperson cited by Reuters. The spokesperson described the ICC and the United Nations as separate institutions with distinct mandates, while calling the court a key pillar of international criminal justice.

What the sanctions mean in practice

The immediate risks are financial, travel-related and operational. A sanctioned official can face blocked property connected to U.S. jurisdiction, restrictions on transactions involving U.S. persons and difficulty obtaining services from institutions that must comply with U.S. sanctions rules. Banks, payment providers, contractors and other businesses may also avoid dealings that create legal or compliance exposure.

Akane’s reported experience illustrates the possible personal effects, including suspended credit cards and disrupted access to basic financial services. It should not be treated as proof that every sanctioned person will face identical consequences.

The sanctions also create uncertainty for people and organizations that work with the court. A blocked official is different from a blocked institution, but service providers may still examine whether payments, contracts, travel or other support involve a designated person or a transaction subject to U.S. jurisdiction.

Why this matters for accountability

The ICC investigates alleged genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes when its jurisdictional rules allow. Pressure on judges, prosecutors and staff therefore reaches beyond individual finances. It may affect whether personnel can obtain ordinary services, whether partners are willing to work with the court and whether member states remain willing to support investigations.

AP reported that the administration’s campaign has now reached nine of the ICC’s 18 judges, both deputy prosecutors, the former chief prosecutor and another prosecution-office staffer. That reported count should be read as a description of the current campaign, not as evidence that the court’s cases or operations have stopped.

The next indicators will be additional U.S. designations, actions by ICC member states, evidence of concrete operational disruption and whether ongoing investigations continue without interruption. For now, the confrontation has widened from disagreement over particular cases to a direct contest over the independence and reach of the international justice system.

Sources

• U.S. Treasury: ICC-related designations and General License 12
• Federal Register: Executive Order 14203
• Associated Press: Akane asks Japan to help de-escalate tensions
• Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Statement on ICC sanctions

The case concerns alleged murder, rape, torture, persecution and related war crimes and crimes against humanity involving detainees at Mitiga prison in Tripoli between 2014 and 2020. It is the first ICC trial proceeding focused on Libya.

What the judges confirmed

The ICC’s charge-confirmation decision was issued on July 16, 2026. The decision found sufficient grounds for the case to proceed, according to the court’s record and reporting by the Associated Press.

Prosecutors allege that El Hishri held a senior command role at Mitiga prison and was connected to abuses against detainees, including sexual violence. Those allegations remain to be tested in the trial process.

Confirmation of charges is not a conviction. At this stage, ICC judges decide whether there are sufficient grounds for a case to proceed; they do not decide whether the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The record has been sent to a trial chamber

The ICC case record shows that the Registry transmitted the proceedings to Trial Chamber VII on July 22. On July 27, the chamber issued an order scheduling the first status conference.

A status conference is a case-management step. It can address scheduling, disclosure of evidence, victims’ participation and other procedural matters, but it is not the start of opening statements or testimony. The ICC has not announced when the trial itself will begin.

Defense appeal request remains unresolved

El Hishri’s defense filed a request for leave to appeal the confirmation decision on July 22. That wording matters: the filing sought permission to appeal and did not by itself establish that a full appeal had been authorized.

On July 24, the Appeals Chamber issued a decision on a related defense request to suspend the Regulation 64(2) time limit. The court record also lists responses from the prosecution and victims’ representatives. Those filings could affect the schedule, but the available record does not show that the confirmation decision has been overturned or that leave to appeal has been granted.

Why the ICC has jurisdiction

The judges separately upheld the court’s jurisdiction over the case. Libya is not a party to the Rome Statute, but the United Nations Security Council referred the Libya situation to the ICC in Resolution 1970 on February 26, 2011.

Libya later accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute for alleged crimes committed on its territory from 2011 through the end of 2027, according to the ICC. That framework allows the court to pursue the case even though Libya is not a Rome Statute member.

What happens next

The first status conference is the next immediate procedural milestone. The Trial Chamber will manage the case while the court continues handling the defense’s appeal-related filings and any responses from the prosecution and victims’ representatives.

For victims and accountability advocates, the case’s movement beyond charge confirmation creates a formal path toward a public examination of alleged abuses at Mitiga prison. But the outcome remains unresolved: the charges have been confirmed, the alleged conduct has not been proven, and no trial date has been announced.

Sources

• ICC case records for The Prosecutor v. Khaled Mohamed Ali El Hishri
• Associated Press report on the Libya case
• ICC background on Libya jurisdiction

A joint-letter communication dated July 23, 2026, and listed by the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, was addressed to the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC. It carries the reference JOL OTH 44/2026.

The communication said alleged inadequacies in the procedures could affect both complainants and respondents. It also identified potential consequences for the ICC’s work prosecuting international crimes and for public confidence in the Court, which is responsible for pursuing accountability for some of the gravest offenses under international law.

The communication is not a finding that any ICC personnel committed misconduct, and the public listing does not establish that the Court has adopted procedural changes or completed a related investigation. The Assembly of States Parties is the body addressed; the listing does not state whether it has formally responded or scheduled a decision. Any future response or action by the Assembly would determine whether the concerns lead to changes in the Court’s complaint-handling framework.

The finding comes amid controversy over Khan’s leadership and the credibility of the court, based in The Hague, Netherlands. The dispute has particular relevance to ICC investigations related to Palestine. Former Human Rights Watch executive director Kenneth Roth said the court’s investigations and arrest warrants would remain unaffected even if Khan were removed.

That means a change in the prosecutor’s position would not, by itself, cancel the court’s ongoing work or the legal status of its warrants, according to Roth’s assessment reported by Reuters. The finding does not establish that any warrant has been executed or that a case has reached trial.

The development therefore concerns institutional continuity and accountability, not a final ruling on the merits of the Palestine-related cases. The ICC’s decisions docket is the next public reference for any administrative or procedural change involving the court or its investigations and warrants.

The decision removes one prosecutor from office and opens a leadership transition at the ICC, the international court responsible for investigating and prosecuting alleged international crimes within its mandate. The court’s work continues, but the change places its next succession process at the center of attention.

What changed at the court

The Assembly of States Parties is the ICC’s governing body. During the July 24 special session, it decided to remove Khan as prosecutor. The approved sources do not provide the exact vote tally or identify which governments or political groups supported the decision.

The grounds reported by Human Rights Watch are serious misconduct and a serious breach of duty. Those descriptions state the basis given for the institutional decision; they do not, by themselves, establish a criminal conviction or a court judgment against Khan. The available packet does not provide a separate judicial finding.

The prosecutor leads the ICC Office of the Prosecutor, which handles investigations and prosecutions before the court. That role gives the removal significance beyond a personnel change: it affects the leadership of the office responsible for advancing cases involving alleged international crimes.

Why the succession matters

Reuters reported on July 27 that the ICC is searching for a new prosecutor after Khan’s removal. The news agency described the search as difficult because the court is operating amid political pressure and U.S. sanctions targeting the institution.

Reuters also reported that the next election will test the court’s procedures and independence. The selection will therefore be watched not only for who is chosen, but also for how the Assembly manages the transition and demonstrates confidence in the office’s future work.

The timing adds to the institutional stakes. Human Rights Watch described the leadership change as significant for a court that serves as a court of last resort for international crimes. Amnesty International, in a July 14 statement, documented broader pressure on the ICC, including threats involving sanctions, visa restrictions and diplomatic pressure.

Those pressures form the wider environment in which the court must replace its prosecutor. They do not, however, establish how the removal will affect any particular investigation or prosecution. The approved sources do not say that the decision invalidates ICC warrants or cases, and they do not establish a specific operational change in an ongoing proceeding.

What happens next

The immediate next step is the search for a successor to Khan. Reuters identified that process as consequential for the court, while the available sources do not identify a successor or give a final timetable for the next prosecutor’s election.

Until those details are established, the confirmed development is the change in leadership of the Office of the Prosecutor. The court continues its investigations and prosecutions while the Assembly’s succession process proceeds.

For governments, victims and observers of international justice, the transition will be a test of the ICC’s institutional accountability and its ability to maintain credible procedures under pressure. The July 24 decision has settled who no longer leads the prosecutorial office. It has not yet settled who will take over, when that election will occur or what effect the transition will have on individual cases.

Rubio described the administration’s position as an effort to dismantle what it views as a threat to U.S. sovereignty. The reported move is a campaign and policy position, not evidence that the court has been dismantled, weakened or abandoned by its members.

The reported U.S. position also continues broader disputes over the court’s jurisdiction and investigations. Earlier sanctions against ICC officials had already made the court’s work a point of conflict with Washington. The new campaign, as described by Rubio and reported by Reuters, expands that dispute into a broader diplomatic effort.

The July 16, 2026 decision concerns allegations involving Mitiga Prison in Tripoli between 2014 and 2020. Prosecutors accuse El Hishri of war crimes and crimes against humanity including murder, torture, rape, other sexual violence, enslavement, persecution, imprisonment and other inhumane acts.

El Hishri is accused of holding a senior role at Mitiga Prison and within the Special Deterrence Forces, also known as RADA. The allegations remain unproven. The confirmation decision is not a conviction or a final finding of guilt.

What the judges decided

At the ICC’s confirmation-of-charges stage, judges assess whether there are substantial grounds to believe that an accused person committed the charged crimes. That is a lower threshold than the proof beyond a reasonable doubt required for a conviction at trial.

Pre-Trial Chamber I confirmed all 17 charges unanimously. The ruling allows the case to proceed to a trial chamber, where prosecutors will have to prove the allegations and the defense will have an opportunity to challenge the evidence.

The judges also rejected El Hishri’s jurisdiction challenge on July 15. The confirmation decision may be appealed only with authorization from the pretrial chamber. The record was transmitted toward Trial Chamber VII in July, but no trial date had been announced as of August 5, 2026, and no appeal was described in the available reporting as accepted or decided.

What prosecutors allege

Prosecutors allege that detainees at Mitiga Prison were unlawfully imprisoned and subjected to killings, torture, severe mistreatment and sexual violence. The charging materials also allege conduct amounting to enslavement, persecution and other inhumane acts.

Human Rights Watch said the prosecution evidence could concern crimes against more than 900 detainees during the period in which El Hishri allegedly controlled the facility, while noting that the lists of incidents and victims were not exhaustive. Those claims will be tested through the trial process.

How El Hishri reached The Hague

German authorities arrested El Hishri in July 2025 on a sealed ICC warrant. Following domestic proceedings, Germany surrendered him to the Netherlands in December 2025, and he has remained in ICC custody in The Hague.

The surrender enabled the court to conduct the confirmation proceedings in his presence. It also illustrates the practical importance of cooperation by national authorities in ICC cases, which depend on states to execute arrest warrants and transfer suspects to the court.

Why the case matters for Libya

The El Hishri case is described by rights groups and independent reporting as the first ICC trial arising from the Libya situation. The U.N. Security Council referred the situation to the court in Resolution 1970 on February 26, 2011, and the ICC opened its investigation in March of that year.

Libya is not a party to the Rome Statute, but the Security Council referral gave the ICC jurisdiction over the situation. Libya also accepted the court’s jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed from 2011 through the end of 2027 in a declaration lodged in May 2025.

For victims and survivors, the ruling creates a formal accountability process and the possibility of participation in the proceedings. It does not guarantee a conviction, reparations or wider accountability for abuses in Libya. Those outcomes will depend on the evidence, witness participation, court cooperation and whether other suspects are arrested.

The immediate change is procedural but consequential: the case has cleared the confirmation stage and is moving toward a trial chamber. The timing and eventual result remain unresolved.

Sources

• International Criminal Court Court Records — El Hishri procedural records
• Associated Press — ICC judges order a Libyan suspect to stand trial
• Human Rights Watch — Libya: ICC Greenlights First Case to Move to Trial
• International Federation for Human Rights — El Hishri confirmation decision

The Venezuelan government announced the decision on July 24, 2026, describing it as “irrevocable” and alleging that the ICC has a geographic bias that disproportionately targets countries in Africa and Latin America. The U.N. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela urged the government on July 27 to reverse course and cooperate with international justice mechanisms.

The dispute is both political and legal. Venezuela presents the decision as an objection to sovereignty and fairness. The fact-finding mission said withdrawal could reinforce impunity. Neither position changes the treaty timetable by itself.

Venezuela is not outside the ICC yet

Article 127 of the Rome Statute says a state party may withdraw by sending written notification to the U.N. secretary-general. The withdrawal takes effect one year after the date the notification is received, unless the notification specifies a later date.

That means the July 24 public announcement does not, on its own, establish the date on which the one-year period began. The formal receipt and dating of any written notification remain important because they determine when the withdrawal could take legal effect.

What Article 127 preserves

Withdrawal does not erase obligations that arose while a country was a party to the Statute, including financial obligations that had already accrued.

Article 127 also says withdrawal does not affect cooperation with the Court in criminal investigations or proceedings for which the withdrawing state had a duty to cooperate and that began before the withdrawal became effective. Nor does it prejudice the continued consideration of any matter that was already under consideration by the Court before that date.

In practical terms, an eventual withdrawal would not automatically terminate the ICC’s Venezuela situation or erase potential accountability for conduct covered by the Statute during the period when Venezuela was a party. The ICC’s institutional record remains the relevant source for the Court’s relationship with Venezuela and the situation under consideration.

Why the U.N. mission objected

The U.N. fact-finding mission said Venezuela’s decision could undermine international accountability and urged the government to rejoin the Court. Its warning was tied to the mission’s broader concerns about alleged gross human-rights violations and international crimes in Venezuela.

The mission’s statements are not criminal judgments, and the allegations remain allegations unless established through a competent judicial process. Reuters reported that the ICC had previously said there was a reasonable basis to believe that civilian officials, members of the armed forces and pro-government individuals may have committed crimes against humanity in Venezuela since at least 2017.

Venezuela disputes the Court’s legitimacy and says its geographic-bias objection is part of the reason for leaving. That claim is the government’s position, not an established finding in the treaty or the ICC’s institutional record.

The practical question is cooperation

The legal protections in Article 127 matter, but investigators also depend on evidence, access and cooperation. A withdrawal process can therefore have practical effects before the legal exit takes effect if authorities restrict access, withhold records or stop assisting international mechanisms.

Conversely, the treaty’s continuing provisions mean that the formal end of party status would not automatically end every obligation connected to earlier investigations, proceedings or matters already before the Court. The scope of those duties and the Court’s next procedural steps will depend on the facts of each matter.

What happens next

The next milestones are confirmation of any written notification received by the U.N. secretary-general, calculation of the one-year period under Article 127, and any further procedural updates from the ICC. The practical consequences will also depend on whether Venezuelan authorities continue cooperating, what evidence investigators already possess and whether Caracas reverses its decision.

For victims and investigators, the announcement is a significant warning sign even before any withdrawal becomes legally effective. For the international justice system, it raises a broader question: how much accountability can treaty-based institutions preserve when a government contests their legitimacy and limits access to evidence?

Sources

• OHCHR: U.N. mission urges Venezuela to reverse ICC withdrawal decision
• Reuters: UN mission says Venezuela’s ICC withdrawal undermines accountability
• United Nations Legal Affairs: Rome Statute, Article 127
• International Criminal Court: Venezuela situation and state-party record

Deputy Prosecutor Nazhat Shameem Khan described the development to Reuters on July 9, 2026. On July 15, she told the U.N. Security Council that investigators had made “real, concrete progress” in examining alleged crimes connected to al-Geneina in 2023 and al-Fashir in 2025.

The announcement is important because international criminal cases must connect crimes on the ground to people who allegedly planned, ordered, enabled or otherwise contributed to them. But it does not mean that senior leaders have been publicly charged, named in new warrants, arrested or convicted.

What the ICC says has changed

Khan said the prosecutor’s office had obtained additional, strong evidence linking what was occurring in Darfur to leadership levels. She did not identify the leaders or say which force they allegedly belonged to. She also said court rules limited what she could disclose about any possible applications for arrest warrants.

The investigation covers alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity connected to violence in al-Geneina, also known as al-Junayn​ah, in 2023 and al-Fashir, also known as al-Fasher, in 2025. Reuters reported that U.N. experts have said alleged crimes in the two cities bore the hallmarks of genocide against people from non-Arab tribes. Those are allegations and assessments attributed to the cited sources, not convictions by the ICC.

In her Security Council briefing, Khan said investigators had conducted more than 130 interviews with victims and gathered satellite imagery, documentary evidence, audiovisual material and other digital assets. She also described meeting Darfuri survivors and displaced people in eastern Chad, where investigators have been able to speak with communities affected by the fighting.

The public U.N. transcript of the briefing was generated through automatic speech recognition and is not an official U.N. record. It is useful as a contemporaneous account of Khan’s remarks and statements by individual council members, but exact wording should be checked against the official U.N. record when available.

Evidence is not a charge or conviction

The ICC’s announcement describes investigative progress, not a completed prosecution. Prosecutors must decide whether the evidence supports applications for arrest warrants or other legal steps under the Rome Statute. Judges would then assess any application; an arrest warrant would not itself establish guilt.

The later stages are separate. A suspect must be arrested and surrendered before the court can generally proceed to trial. Judges may hold confirmation proceedings before a case goes to trial, and the prosecution must ultimately prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for a conviction.

Reuters reported that no public ICC arrest warrants had been issued in connection with the current war as of July 9. The court continues to pursue earlier Darfur cases and outstanding warrants, but several suspects remain outside its custody.

Why cooperation and arrests matter

The ICC’s jurisdiction over Darfur comes from the U.N. Security Council’s 2005 referral in Resolution 1593. Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute, but the referral gave the court jurisdiction over Rome Statute crimes committed in Darfur from July 1, 2002, onward.

Khan told the council that cooperation from Sudanese authorities had remained on a positive trajectory. She said that cooperation had enabled further deployments by the prosecutor’s Darfur team to Port Sudan and helped with the collection of information. Sudan’s representative separately said the government had answered four requests for assistance during the reporting period. That statement was made by the Sudanese government and was not independently verified in the transcript.

Khan also said the Rapid Support Forces had not taken action matching indications that they were willing to cooperate and called on the group to engage with her office. Several council members separately welcomed assistance from Sudanese authorities while urging action on outstanding warrants. Those statements reflected the positions of individual governments, not a unanimous judicial finding on every allegation in the war.

Arrests and surrender remain decisive because the ICC generally cannot try suspects who are not brought before it. The Security Council discussion also highlighted the need to preserve evidence and protect witnesses. Khan said investigators have not been able to access Darfur directly and that witness-protection needs are significant.

What survivors are still waiting for

For survivors, accountability is not limited to a future courtroom judgment. The July 15 briefing and council statements emphasized protection for witnesses, survivor-centered investigations, documentation of sexual and gender-based violence, continued contact with affected communities and reparations.

The reported breakthrough suggests that investigators may be moving closer to people who allegedly ordered or enabled crimes, rather than only those accused of carrying them out. It does not establish command responsibility, identify public suspects or show that anyone has been charged.

The next test is whether the evidence can support legally sufficient applications and whether states and armed groups will help secure suspects, protect witnesses and preserve proof. That gap between evidence and enforcement is central to Darfur—and to the broader question of whether international criminal investigations can reach senior decision-makers while an active war is still unfolding.

Sources

• Reuters — ICC official says breakthrough made in Darfur investigations
• U.N. Security Council — Sudan and South Sudan, 10197th meeting
• International Criminal Court — Darfur, Sudan situation
• Associated Press — Sudan paramilitary leaders accused of war crimes in Amnesty report

The decision, taken during a special Assembly session at United Nations headquarters in New York, is the first removal of an ICC chief prosecutor. It leaves the court facing an unprecedented leadership transition while its investigations and prosecutions continue.

What the Assembly decided

According to Reuters, 82 of the ICC’s 125 member states voted for Khan’s removal. Deutsche Welle, citing reporting from several international news organizations, reported 13 votes against and 15 abstentions. Because the ballot was secret and a detailed official roll call was not located in the sources reviewed, those totals should be treated as reported figures rather than a published member-by-member record.

The Assembly’s finding was an institutional removal decision, not a criminal conviction. Khan faced allegations of sexual misconduct involving a female aide, which he has denied. The Assembly determined that the conduct met the standard of serious misconduct and a serious breach of duty under the process governing possible removal from office.

Khan plans to challenge the decision

Khan’s lawyer, Tayab Ali, said Khan would challenge the lawfulness and fairness of the removal through available legal mechanisms, according to The Associated Press.

AP reported that there is no ordinary appeals process for the Assembly’s removal decision, but ICC staff may bring complaints to a special labor tribunal in Geneva. Khan’s lawyers have also objected to aspects of the process, including what they described as limits on his ability to address the session and changes to the applicable regulations. Those objections are separate from the completed Assembly decision and could produce further procedural developments.

The court’s work continues

The ICC’s two deputy prosecutors will continue handling the Office of the Prosecutor’s leadership, management and administration while member states select a replacement, AP reported.

The timing of that selection is not yet clear. Khan’s election in 2021 took nearly 18 months, according to AP, and the next process will take place while the court manages politically sensitive investigations and prosecutions.

Arrest warrants are not automatically affected

Khan’s removal does not cancel or suspend ICC arrest warrants. Arrest warrants are judicial instruments, and only ICC judges can withdraw them. The warrants issued in 2024 for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant therefore remain in force unless judges take a separate decision, AP reported.

The same distinction applies to the court’s broader caseload: a change in prosecutorial leadership does not by itself terminate investigations, prosecutions or judicial orders.

Why the transition matters

The leadership change comes as the ICC faces significant pressure, including U.S. sanctions and threats against court personnel and wider disputes over its investigations. AP reported that the Assembly’s vote was not a proxy vote on a specific ICC situation. That statement does not eliminate the political significance of the transition, but it does mean the vote should not be described as a referendum on the court’s Gaza, Ukraine, Afghanistan or other investigations.

The immediate issue is institutional continuity. The deputy prosecutors must keep ongoing cases moving, while member states must choose a successor capable of operating under political pressure and maintaining confidence in the court’s independence.

For now, the confirmed change is Khan’s removal and the start of an unprecedented replacement process. The next developments are likely to involve his legal challenge, continued administration of ICC cases and negotiations over the court’s next prosecutor.

Sources

• Associated Press — ICC chief prosecutor removed over sexual misconduct allegations
• Reuters — ICC members dismiss prosecutor Karim Khan, diplomatic sources say
• International Criminal Court — Rome Statute

The move does not take Chad out of the court immediately. Under Article 127 of the Rome Statute, withdrawal generally takes effect one year after the U.N. secretary-general receives the written notification. The United Nations treaty depositary lists Chad’s effective withdrawal date as July 27, 2027.

What Chad announced

Chad accused the ICC of ineffectiveness and bias against African countries. Those are the government’s stated criticisms, not established findings by the court or an independent legal ruling.

The ICC prosecutes individuals—not governments—for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression when the court has jurisdiction. Chad’s notification begins a treaty process; it is not an immediate termination of ICC membership or jurisdiction.

What the treaty says

Article 127 allows a state party to withdraw through written notification addressed to the U.N. secretary-general. The withdrawal takes effect one year after the notification is received unless the notification specifies a later date.

The article also says a state is not released from obligations that arose while it was a party, including financial obligations. Withdrawal does not affect cooperation with the court in criminal investigations or proceedings for which the state had a duty to cooperate and that began before withdrawal became effective.

Nor does withdrawal prevent the court from continuing to consider a matter that was already under consideration before the effective date. For victims, witnesses and investigators, the practical effect will therefore depend on the status of particular matters and on Chad’s future cooperation.

Part of a wider political dispute

The United Nations treaty depositary lists formal withdrawal notifications from Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali and Chad in 2026. The first three are recorded with effective dates of June 18 or June 24, 2027, while Chad’s is recorded for July 27, 2027.

The notifications do not have identical political circumstances or case histories. But together they add to a dispute over the ICC’s legitimacy, national sovereignty and the court’s treatment of African states. Chad and other critics describe the court as selective or disproportionately focused on Africa; those claims should be distinguished from independent assessments of the court’s record.

U.S. reaction is separate from causation

The United States welcomed Chad’s decision. The State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs said Chad was reclaiming its sovereignty from what the bureau called a flawed institution and encouraged other countries to withdraw.

That public reaction documents Washington’s political position, but it does not establish that U.S. pressure caused Chad’s decision. Chad gave its own explanation, centered on the court’s effectiveness, sovereignty and its criticism of the ICC’s focus on Africa.

What happens next

The U.N. treaty record now identifies Chad’s notification date and the corresponding effective withdrawal date. Until July 27, 2027, Chad remains a party to the Rome Statute. Even after that date, Article 127 preserves certain obligations connected to the period when Chad was a member.

For victims and accountability groups, the key question will be whether Chad continues to provide access, evidence and other cooperation in matters already before the court or in proceedings that began before withdrawal takes effect. For the ICC, the notification adds to institutional pressure as the court faces criticism from governments, U.S. sanctions and a transition in its prosecutor’s office.

Chad has started a withdrawal process, not completed an immediate exit. That distinction matters: the announcement increases political pressure on the court, but it does not erase past crimes, automatically end existing proceedings or immediately terminate treaty-based cooperation.

Sources

• Associated Press: Chad announces intent to withdraw from the ICC
• United Nations: Rome Statute, Article 127
• United Nations Treaty Collection: Rome Statute status

Prosecutors allege that El Hishri was a senior figure associated with the administration of Tripoli’s Mitiga Prison and may be responsible for abuses against detainees there between 2014 and 2020. The confirmation decision does not establish guilt, and no trial start date has been announced.

What changed on July 16

Pre-Trial Chamber I found substantial grounds to believe that El Hishri may be responsible for the charges and committed the case to trial. The alleged crimes include murder, attempted murder, rape, sexual violence, torture, cruel treatment, imprisonment, enslavement, persecution and other inhumane acts.

The ruling is significant because it moves the first ICC case arising from the Libya situation toward a full trial. It is not the first ICC investigation, arrest warrant or Libya-related case. The court has been investigating the Libya situation since the United Nations Security Council referred it to the prosecutor in 2011.

What prosecutors allege

The case concerns alleged mistreatment of detainees held at Mitiga Prison in Tripoli during the 2014-2020 period. Human Rights Watch reported that the prosecution’s evidence could concern more than 900 detainees, but that figure is a non-final scope estimate rather than a determination of the number of victims.

El Hishri is presumed innocent unless and until guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt before a Trial Chamber. Confirmation of charges is a pretrial decision that the evidence meets the threshold for the case to proceed. It is not a conviction or a final judgment on the alleged facts.

Why jurisdiction mattered

The trial decision followed a separate ruling on July 15, when Pre-Trial Chamber I rejected El Hishri’s challenge to the ICC’s jurisdiction. The defense had argued that the court lacked authority to hear the case. By rejecting that challenge, the judges allowed the proceedings to continue.

The two rulings answered different questions. The July 15 decision addressed whether the ICC could exercise jurisdiction over the case. The July 16 decision addressed whether the prosecution evidence met the legal threshold for sending the charges to trial.

What happens next

The case will move to a Trial Chamber, which will manage the next procedural steps and eventually assess the evidence. The confirmation decision could be appealed if the relevant authorization is granted. The selected sources do not report that an appeal has been filed.

The ICC has not announced a trial date. Future milestones include trial scheduling, arrangements for witnesses and victims, and measures to protect people involved in the proceedings.

The cooperation test

German authorities arrested El Hishri in July 2025 and surrendered him to the ICC in December 2025 after domestic proceedings, according to Human Rights Watch. He has remained in ICC custody in The Hague.

Broader cooperation remains unresolved. Human Rights Watch and other accountability organizations have called on Libyan authorities to support the proceedings and address outstanding ICC arrest warrants, while reporting that cooperation with the court has been inadequate. The status of other Libya-related suspects remains an important factor in the court’s ability to pursue additional cases.

For victims and their families, the July 16 decision is a significant accountability step. But the central questions—whether the allegations can be proven, how witnesses will be protected and when proceedings will begin—remain ahead.

Sources

• International Criminal Court: El Hishri confirmation-of-charges decision
• Associated Press: ICC judges order a Libyan suspect to stand trial
• Human Rights Watch: Libya ICC case moves to trial

ICC Trial Chamber IV issued the decision on July 23, 2026, after prosecutors withdrew three war-crimes charges tied to the alleged September 29, 2007 attack on an African Union peacekeeping site at Haskanita in North Darfur. The chamber also vacated Banda’s arrest warrant.

Why the case ended

The prosecution said it no longer believed there were reasonable prospects of conviction. Its concerns included the loss of confidence in two key witnesses and the emergence of a new witness whose testimony could help clear Banda.

The chamber’s reasoning was narrower and independent. It said prosecutors had not shown that the evidence had deteriorated so severely that a trial was impossible. But the judges concluded that continuing the case without a prosecution willing to present it would conflict with the court’s duty to ensure a fair and efficient trial.

That distinction matters. The ICC did not acquit Banda, convict him or find that he was innocent. The proceedings ended without a trial verdict, and the ruling does not establish that the alleged attack did not occur or that all of the charges were disproved.

What the decision means for victims

The case involved 103 participating victims, many of whom had waited more than 15 years for the possibility of justice. With the proceedings terminated, the specific ICC prosecution is over for now, leaving victims without a trial judgment on the allegations.

The decision illustrates a recurring difficulty in international criminal cases: the passage of time can affect witness availability, credibility and the court’s ability to test evidence. A suspect’s continued absence can add another obstacle when the prosecution cannot move forward in a practical and fair way.

A future case is not legally barred

The chamber left open the possibility of a future case based on the same or similar facts. That is not a decision to reopen the prosecution, and it does not indicate that prosecutors will pursue one. It means only that the termination does not legally prevent a later case if the necessary conditions and evidence emerge.

The Banda ruling comes as the ICC and other accountability mechanisms continue to address alleged atrocity crimes in Sudan. In a July 3 statement, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk called for action at the highest levels to prevent further atrocity crimes and stressed the continuing need for accountability.

For the court, the case is a consequential example of the balance international criminal justice must maintain. Victims may have a strong interest in a full trial, but the ICC must also ensure that a prosecution is supported by evidence that can be fairly and efficiently presented. In Banda’s case, the result was the end of the proceedings without a finding on guilt or innocence.

Sources

• International Criminal Court case records
• Associated Press report
• United Nations in Sudan statement

For U.S. and other English-speaking observers, the personnel change lands amid long-running friction: AP reports the U.S. has pursued steps to “dismantle” what it says is a threat posed by the ICC to U.S. sovereignty. The key practical issue is what this leadership break does, and what it does not.

What the ASP decided on July 24

Human Rights Watch reports that during a special session on July 24, the ASP decided to remove Khan for “serious misconduct and serious breach of duty.” AP reports the removal was approved by a large majority of the ICC’s 125 member states.

AP also reports that the misconduct allegations involved Khan and a female aide, allegations Khan has denied. AP further says Khan was removed nearly two years after the allegations first emerged.

AP adds that Khan’s lawyers criticized the process leading to his ouster, including complaints that he was blocked from addressing the session and that regulations were rewritten to disadvantage him.

What changes next inside the ICC—and what the court says stays the same

A leadership change does not automatically reset the court’s work. In its statement on the ASP decision, the ICC said its Deputy Prosecutors would continue to provide the leadership, management, and direction of the Office of the Prosecutor until a new chief is selected.

AP also reports the ASP oversight body will need to hold elections for a new prosecutor.

What the removal may not change right away

One of the most concrete “continuity” points in the early reporting: AP says Khan’s removal will have no immediate impact on arrest warrants in 2024 for Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant for crimes against humanity. AP reports those warrants can only be withdrawn by ICC judges.

Legal baseline: what “removal from office” means under the Rome Statute

Under the Rome Statute framework, the ASP is the body that can remove the prosecutor after disciplinary proceedings finding serious misconduct and/or a serious breach of duty. Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a statement dated July 25, said it welcomed the July 24 ASP decision and characterized it as the ASP functioning appropriately under Rome Statute procedures.

Why this matters for war-crimes justice—and for U.S.–ICC tensions

HRW framed the decision as a test of institutional independence and emphasized the need for safe workplace mechanisms for staff who experience abuse, including sexual violence or harassment. AP ties the broader moment to U.S. political pressure on the ICC—making the question for diplomats and watchdogs whether leadership continuity (via deputy prosecutors) helps the court sustain momentum, even as political attacks continue.

• ASP elections for a new prosecutor: who is selected, and how quickly the court’s leadership stabilizes.
• Interim management: how Deputy Prosecutors manage ongoing priorities while the new prosecutor is chosen.
• Judicial enforcement posture: whether anything changes procedurally around existing warrants, noting AP’s report on no immediate impact from Khan’s removal.

Sources

• Associated Press — Khan removed by ICC vote (disciplinary outcome and early implications)
• Human Rights Watch — ICC prosecutor removed statement (accountability framing and what changes/what doesn’t)
• Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs — Statement welcoming removal (official diplomatic reaction)
• ICC statement on ASP decision (distributed copy via PublicNow)
• Rome Statute (English) — removal-from-office legal framework (Article 46 and related provisions)

The step is significant because it advances the case from the ICC’s pre-trial stage into the trial phase—where the Trial Chamber’s proceedings are built around testing the allegations.

Timeline: July 15 jurisdiction hurdle, then July 16 charge confirmation and trial commitment

July 15, 2026: The ICC rejected El Hishri’s Article 19 challenge to the court’s jurisdiction, clearing a key pre-trial hurdle.

July 16, 2026: The ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed all charges and committed El Hishri to trial before an ICC Trial Chamber. The ICC court record lists the July 16 decision as ICC-01/11-01/25-143.

What the ICC says the case is about (and what it doesn’t mean)

According to the ICC and rights-focused reporting, the alleged conduct relates to crimes involving detainees at Tripoli’s Mitiga Prison. It’s essential to keep the legal framing precise: confirmation of charges and commitment to trial are procedural steps—not findings that the accused is guilty.

Why moving into trial can matter for victims and witnesses

When a case moves from pre-trial into the trial phase, the ICC process typically becomes more trial-oriented—focused on how evidence is presented and how testimony is handled under the Trial Chamber’s control. For victims and witnesses, that shift often means the accountability process becomes more concrete in practical terms, as the case is now designed to proceed through trial proceedings rather than remain in threshold or jurisdiction review.

What to watch next

With the commitment to trial, attention should shift to the trial phase itself—particularly ICC procedural scheduling and trial-stage filings as the case transitions into Trial Chamber management. Specific next steps will depend on the court’s procedural calendar.

Quick explainer: ICC pre-trial vs. trial (plain terms)

• Pre-trial phase: the ICC addresses foundational questions, including jurisdiction and whether charges meet the threshold to proceed.
• Trial phase: the ICC’s Trial Chamber oversees proceedings designed to test the allegations through the trial process.

For U.S. and English-speaking readers following accountability across borders, El Hishri’s case illustrates how, once jurisdiction issues are cleared, ICC cases can move quickly from pre-trial steps into trial-stage proceedings.

Sources

• ICC News Release (July 16, 2026) — confirmation of charges and commitment to trial
• AP and Human Rights Watch (context on stakes for accountability/victims)

This matters for accountability because it moves the matter from the pre-trial confirmation stage toward a courtroom process where evidence, witnesses, and defenses are handled under trial procedures. Importantly, confirmation of charges is not a conviction, and guilt is not decided until the trial is completed.

Who is Khaled Mohamed Ali El Hishri, and what is the case?

El Hishri is the suspect identified in the ICC case record ICC-01/11-01/25-143. The July 16 ruling comes after earlier pre-trial steps in the ICC’s structured process.

What the charges concern, according to the case record and reporting

Reporting on the ICC decision ties the case to alleged detention-abuse conduct linked to Tripoli’s Mitiga Prison, including allegations involving torture, rape, murder, and other related serious crimes.

What changed on July 16 (and why it’s a big deal)

The key shift is procedural: judges confirmed the charges at the pre-trial stage and then committed the case to a trial chamber. In practical terms, that escalation is one of the clearest indicators that the case is now positioned to move into trial preparation rather than remaining at the earlier phase of deciding whether the case can proceed on particular charges.

Why this matters for victims and for “impunity risk”

For victims and accountability-focused observers, a commitment to trial signals that alleged crimes connected to detention conditions can reach the ICC’s courtroom track—rather than stopping at preliminary stages. The next phase is also where the public record becomes more concrete: filings, evidence management, and witness-related procedures become the focus.

What to watch next

After a confirmation-to-trial commitment, readers should watch for the trial chamber’s scheduling and procedural orders in the ICC case record—especially updates that clarify how and when the trial will proceed.

Sources

• ICC court record (primary decision)
• AP News (event explanation)
• Human Rights Watch (victim-accountability context)