Supreme Court limits “clear and convincing” border standard for some LPRs

The U.S. Supreme Court on June 23, 2026, in Blanche v. Lau (No. 25–429) vacated a Second Circuit approach that had required border officers to use a special “clear and convincing” evidence standard before treating certain returning lawful permanent residents (LPRs) as “seeking admission”.

The Court held that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) does not impose that “clear and convincing” requirement at the border under INA § 101(a)(13)(C)(v). But the Court did not resolve the underlying merits question for remand—whether the alleged offense qualifies as a “crime involving moral turpitude” (CIMT), which can determine how removals are charged and litigated.

Quick context: what the Supreme Court changed

In the case, the government treated the LPR as “seeking admission” at the border under the INA. The Second Circuit had added an evidentiary hurdle—requiring “clear and convincing” proof that the person committed the relevant crime—then vacated the removal order. The Supreme Court disagreed with that added “clear and convincing” requirement and sent the case back for further proceedings.

Plain-English background: what “seeking admission” is supposed to do

Returning LPRs are often treated differently from people who are trying to enter the U.S. for the first time. The INA includes an exception under which some returning LPRs can be treated as applicants to be admitted—meaning the “seeking admission” framing can become the threshold issue that drives what inadmissibility arguments the government uses.

The holding: no special “clear and convincing” border burden in the statute

According to the Supreme Court, the INA’s text and structure do not require border officers to apply a special “clear and convincing evidence” standard at the encounter before they classify a qualifying returning LPR as “seeking admission” under INA § 101(a)(13)(C)(v).

What remains open for remand is the case-specific legal classification question: whether the underlying offense qualifies as a CIMT—an issue that can materially affect how the removal case proceeds.

Who is affected—and what to watch if you’re an LPR who traveled

This ruling is most likely to matter in situations where an LPR’s border encounter follows a trip abroad and the government argues that a criminal allegation or history can fit within the INA’s “seeking admission” exception. Practitioner guidance has emphasized that travel during periods involving potential criminal exposure can change how encounters are categorized and how paperwork and arguments develop.

For individual outcomes, facts matter—pending charges are not the same as convictions, and CIMT disputes are often complex. This is not legal advice; affected travelers should speak with qualified immigration counsel about their specific circumstances before travel.

What happens next

With Blanche v. Lau sent back, the next fight is expected to center on the CIMT classification question—how courts and the government apply the Supreme Court’s clarified “border framework” in comparable LPR reentry disputes, including how immigration courts handle the remand in future cases.

Sources

• U.S. Supreme Court opinion (Blanche v. Lau), No. 25–429
• American Immigration Council practice advisory on travel after Blanche v. Lau
• ILRC practice advisory (posted Jul 14, 2026)